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Delegation and Original Meaning
Gary Lawson*
88 Va. L. Rev. – (2002) (forthcoming)

Abstract
The nondelegation doctrine may be dead as doctrine, but it is very much alive as a
subject of academic study. Concurring opinions by Justices Thomas and Stevens in the
American Trucking case raise anew the question whether the nondelegation doctrine has
any grounding in the Constitution's text and structure. The answer is "yes." The
nondelegation doctrine flows directly from the doctrine of enumerated powers: the
executive and judiciary have no enumerated power to make law, and Congress has no
enumerated power to constitute them as lawmakers. The correct formulation of the
Constitution's nondelegation doctrine was outlined by Chief Justice Marshall in 1825,
and no one has improved on his formulation in nearly two centuries.

DELEGATION AND ORIGINAL MEANING
Gary Lawson*
88 Va. L. Rev. – (2002) (forthcoming)

Section 109(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act specifies that primary air quality standards
“shall be ambient air quality standards the attainment and maintenance of which in the
judgment of the Administrator [of the Environmental Protection Agency] . . . are requisite
to protect the public health.” 1 In 1999, a panel of the D.C. Circuit held that this statute,
as interpreted by the Environmental Protection Agency, left the agency so much leeway
in the setting of air quality standards that it violated the nondelegation doctrine.2

In

Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns,3 the Supreme Court unanimously reversed that
judgment. The Court construed the statute to mandate air quality standards that are
“’requisite’--that is, not lower or higher than is necessary--to protect the public health
with an adequate margin of safety,”4 and it held that such a standard “fits comfortably
within the scope of discretion permitted by our precedent.”5

* Professor, Boston University School of Law. I am grateful to Mike Rappaport and David Schoenbrod
for their invaluable comments and to the Abraham and Lillian Benton Fund for support.
1

42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2000). In addition to the primary standards that are “requisite to protect the
public health,” the statute also calls for secondary standards that are “requisite to protect the public welfare
from any known or anticipated adverse effects associated with the presence of such air pollutant in the
ambient air.” Id. § 7409(b)(2).
2

American Trucking Ass’ns. v. U.S. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999), modified, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C.
Cir. 1999).
3

121 S. Ct. 903 (2001).

4

Id. at 914.

5

Id.

The Supreme Court’s 9-0 decision in American Trucking was predictable and
entirely unremarkable. The truly remarkable fact is that in the year 2001, the Court still
found it necessary to reverse a lower court decision on the nondelegation doctrine.
American Trucking is merely the latest in a long, unbroken line of setbacks for
proponents of the nondelegation doctrine. The Supreme Court has rejected literally every
nondelegation challenge that it has considered since 1935,6 including challenges to
statutes that instruct agencies to regulate in “the public interest, convenience, or
necessity”7 and to set “fair and equitable” prices.8 After 1935, the Court has steadfastly
maintained that Congress need only provide an “intelligible principle”9 to guide
decisionmaking, and it has steadfastly found intelligible principles where less discerning
readers find gibberish.
In 1989, in Mistretta v. United States,10 the Court brought more than half a
century of case law to culmination by unanimously declaring the nondelegation doctrine
to be effectively a dead letter.11 The eight-Justice majority in Mistretta upheld an open-

6

In that year, of course, the Court held unconstitutional provisions of the National Industrial Recovery
Act. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); A. L. A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
295 U.S. 495 (1935).
7

National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-26 (1943).

8

Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426 (1944). The NBC and Yakus decisions, perhaps along with
American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90 (1946), which rejected a delegation challenge to the
provisions of the Public Utility Holding Company Act that forbid “unfair[] or inequitabl[e]” distributions of
voting power, are generally put forth as the death certificates for a judicially enforceable nondelegation
doctrine. If statutes as vacuous as those are constitutional, the argument goes, surely there are no
cognizable requirements of specificity for congressional statutes.
9

The phrase originated in J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928), though the
case did not necessarily use the phrase in quite the way that modern law surmises. See infra XXX.
10
11

488 U.S. 361 (1989).

Mistretta stopped just short of declaring the doctrine nonjusticiable. The federal courts have jurisdiction
to hear nondelegation challenges – just as they have jurisdiction to review, for example, challenges to an
agency’s decision whether to initiate a rulemaking. But in both cases the courts are so despairing about the

ended grant of authority to the United States Sentencing Commission12 in terms that
should have left no doubt about the fate of future nondelegation challenges.13 Justice
Scalia, who authored the majority opinion in American Trucking, dissented from the
judgment in Mistretta because of a technical quirk in the design of the Sentencing
Commission’s authority,14 but he was even more emphatic than was the majority about
the futility of garden-variety nondelegation claims.15 It was painfully obvious that the
Court in Mistretta was trying to take the nondelegation doctrine off of the constitutional
agenda for the foreseeable future.

possibility of discerning principles to guide decisionmaking that they effectively treat the issues as
nonreviewable.
12

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98 (1994) (establishing and defining the authority of the Commission). The
statute sets forth a wide range of goals, purposes, and factors for the Commission to consider, see 488 U.S.
at 374-77, but at the end of the day “[t]he Commission does have discretionary authority to determine the
relative severity of federal crimes and the assess the relative weight of the offender characteristics that
Congress listed for the Commission to consider,” id. at 377, the Commission has “significant discretion to
determine which crimes have been punished too leniently, and which too severely,” id., and the
Commission must “exercise its judgment about which types of crimes and which types of criminals are to
be considered similar for the purposes of sentencing.” Id. at 377-78.

13

See 488 U.S. at 372-74, 378-79.

14

Justice Scalia’s problem was that the Sentencing Commission’s sole authority was to promulgate
sentencing rules. Thus, “[t]he lawmaking function of the Sentencing Commission is completely divorced
from any responsibility for the execution of the law or adjudication of private rights under the law.” 488
U.S. at 420. In other words, the statute does not tie the agency’s standardless grant of authority to any task
of law implementation, so that one cannot indulge the fiction that the agency is actually exercising
executive rather than legislative power. In virtually all other cases that potentially raise nondelegation
issues, such as the EPA’s authority under the Clean Air Act, the agency has some responsibility for the
enforcement or implementation of the law, so that its rulemaking authority can be conceptualized under
Justice Scalia’s analysis as ancillary to its distinctively executive functions.

15

See id. at 415-16:
But while the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation is unquestionably a fundamental
element of our constitutional system, it is not an element readily enforceable by the courts. Once
it is conceded, as it must be, that no statute can be entirely precise, and that some judgments, even
some judgments involving policy considerations, must be left to the officers executing the law and
to the judges applying it, the debate over unconstitutional delegation becomes a debate not over a
point of principle but over a question of degree . . . .[I]t is small wonder that we have almost never
felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that
can be left to those executing or applying the law.

It is painfully obvious that the Court’s plan in Mistretta didn’t work. The
nondelegation doctrine is the Energizer Bunny of constitutional law: no matter how many
times it gets broken, beaten, or buried, it just keeps on going and going. The D.C.
Circuit’s decision in American Trucking was merely a continuation of an outpouring of
attempts by lawyers, judges, and scholars in the past decade to find some way around the
unmistakable import of Mistretta. And, in turn, the Supreme Court’s decision in
Whitman was merely a continuation of the Court’s decidedly unsympathetic response to
these efforts.16
Modern scholars have been no more willing than have litigants or lower court
judges to give up on the nondelegation doctrine. Two major books and a major article,
post-Mistretta, have urged revitalization of the nondelegation doctrine.17 Other scholars
have raised nondelegation issues concerning the use of private actors to implement

16

In 1989 in Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212 (1989), the Court unanimously reversed
a district court judgment holding unconstitutional a congressional delegation of the taxing power. See id at
222-23 (finding “no support . . . for Mid-America’s contention that the text of the Constitution or the
practices of Congress require the application of a different and stricter nondelegation doctrine in cases
where Congress delegates discretionary authority to the Executive under its taxing power”). In 1991 in
Touby v. United States, 500 U.S.160 (1991). the Court unanimously declined an invitation to prescribe a
more rigorous nondelegation standard for statutes that delegate the power to define criminal conduct. In
1996 in Department of the Interior v. South Dakota, 519 U.S. 919 (1996), the Court vacated and remanded
an Eighth Circuit decision finding an unconstitutional delegation in a statute giving the Secretary of the
Interior open-ended authority to acquire land for Indians. Also in 1996, in Loving v. United States, 517
U.S. 748 (1996), the Court, without dissent, held that Congress could leave it to the President to specify the
criteria for application of the death penalty in military courts martial. (Justice Thomas concurred in the
judgment without directly addressing the nondelegation question.) And in 1998, in Clinton v. City of New
York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998), challengers of the Line Item Veto Act launched a broad-based nondelegation
challenge to the President’s authority to “cancel in whole” certain spending and tax-preference provisions;
the majority avoided the issue, see id. at 447-48, while the three Justices who addressed it found the statute
obviously constitutional.
17

See Martin H. Redish, The Constitution As Political Structure Ch. 6 (1995); David Schoenbrod,
Power Without Responsibility: How Congress Abuses the People Through Delegation (1993); Michael
B. Rappaport, The Selective Nondelegation Doctrine and the Line Item Veto: A New Approach to the
Nondelegation Doctrine and Its Implications for Clinton v. New York, (forthcoming).

governmental programs.18 Still others have found nondelegation concerns lurking in
cases involving ordinary statutory interpretation.19 And the Court’s decision in Loving v.
United States,20 which unanimously rejected a nondelegation challenge in the context of
the death penalty,21 spawned an entire academic conference on the nondelegation
doctrine entitled “The Phoenix Rises Again: The Nondelegation Doctrine from
Constitutional and Policy Perspectives.”22
There is something very fundamental – indeed, almost primal -- about the
nondelegation doctrine that keeps resuscitating it when any rational observer would have
issued a Code Blue long ago. It is therefore unlikely that the Court’s decision in

18

See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 543 (2000); A. Michael
Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route Around the APA and the Constitution, 50
Duke L.J. 17 (2000); METZGER (forthcoming).
19

See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Schecter Poultry at the Millenium: A Delegation Doctrine for the
Administrative State, 109 Yale L.J. 1399 (2000). Professor Bressman argues that the Supreme Court’s
decision in AT & T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board, 525 U.S. 366 (1999), which held unreasonable the
FCC’s interpretation of the network access provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C.
§ 251(d)(2) (2000), reflected concerns about excessive delegation to the agency and implicitly sought to
address those concerns through application of the Chevron doctrine rather than through direct constitutional
analysis. The article is thoughtful, informative, and well worth reading, but it is entirely wrong about Iowa
Utilities Board. The case holds merely that the agency read its statutory authority in an unreasonably broad
fashion. That decision turns entirely on the language and structure of the relevant statute; it says nothing
about the power of Congress to pass unconstraining statutes, and to permit unconstraining agency
interpretations, if it so desires. For a similar critique of Professor Bressman’s reading of Iowa Utilities
Board, see Mark Seidenfeld & Jim Rossi, The False Promise of the “New” Nondelegation Doctrine, 76
Notre Dame L. Rev. 1. 17-18 (2000).
20

517 U.S. 748 (1996).

21

See supra note 16.

22

The published proceedings of the conference can be found at 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 731-1018 (1999). I
do not want to be misunderstood as in any way criticizing this outstanding conference. The conference
brought together a truly amazing collection of talent, and the published works amply justify the enterprise.
I was invited to participate in the conference, and I would have gratefully and eagerly accepted if the
conference had not been scheduled within days of my wife’s due date for our second child. My point is
only that it is difficult to read the Court’s remarks in Loving as signaling the rebirth of the nondelegation
doctrine. The most that one can say is that Loving did not casually dismiss the plaintiff’s nondelegation
argument as a near-sanctionable waste of time. That was a thin reed on which to balance one’s hopes for
the rise of the phoenix.

American Trucking will put the issue to rest. Indeed, quite to the contrary, the concurring
opinions by Justice Thomas and by Justice Stevens promise to generate a new, even more
vigorous, round of debate.
Justice Thomas joined the majority’s brusque dismissal of the delegation
challenge in American Trucking in light of existing precedent, but he added the following
provocative comment:
The parties to this case who briefed the constitutional issue wrangled over
constitutional doctrine with barely a nod to the text of the Constitution. Although
this Court since 1928 has treated the "intelligible principle" requirement as the
only constitutional limit on congressional grants of power to administrative
agencies . . . , the Constitution does not speak of "intelligible principles." Rather,
it speaks in much simpler terms: "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be
vested in a Congress." U.S. Const., Art. 1, § 1 (emphasis added). I am not
convinced that the intelligible principle doctrine serves to prevent all cessions of
legislative power. I believe that there are cases in which the principle is
intelligible and yet the significance of the delegated decision is simply too great
for the decision to be called anything other than "legislative."
As it is, none of the parties to this case has examined the text of the
Constitution or asked us to reconsider our precedents on cessions of legislative
power. On a future day, however, I would be willing to address the question
whether our delegation jurisprudence has strayed too far from our Founders'
understanding of separation of powers.23
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Souter, added an equally provocative concurring
comment. He argued that one should frankly acknowledge that Congress routinely
delegates legislative power and that one should directly uphold that authority.
Significantly, Justice Stevens insisted that this view is “fully consistent with the text of
the Constitution. In Article I, the Framers vested ‘All legislative Powers’ in the
Congress, Art. I., § 1, just as in Article II they vested the ‘executive Power’ in the
President, Art. II, § 1. Those provisions do not purport to limit the authority of either

23

121 S. Ct. at 919-20.

recipient of power to delegate authority to others.”24 Justice Stevens invoked, inter alia, a
prominent administrative law treatise, which opined that "[t]he Court was probably
mistaken from the outset in interpreting Article I's grant of power to Congress as an
implicit limit on Congress' authority to delegate legislative power.”25 Justice Thomas and
Justice Stevens have thus raised anew the question whether the Constitution actually
contains a nondelegation principle that is measurably more stringent than the modern
Court’s caselaw.
That question has a very straightforward answer: Justice Thomas is clearly right
about the Constitution. It does contain a discernible, textually grounded nondelegation
principle that is far removed from modern doctrine. Justice Stevens is wrong – and quite
fundamentally wrong – to suggest that the Constitution contemplates delegations of
legislative power. If one is concerned about the original meaning of the Constitution, the
widespread modern obsession with the nondelegation doctrine, at least partially reflected
in Justice Thomas’s concurrence, may have some justification.
Part I of this article explains the textual source and precise character of the
Constitution’s nondelegation principle. The nondelegation principle is grounded in the
more basic principle of enumerated powers. Executive officials cannot exercise
legislative powers on their own initiative because they are not granted any such power by
the Constitution. Nor can Congress cure this defect by passing vacuous statutes for such
officials to “execute,” because those statutes will not be “necessary and proper” for
carrying into effect federal powers and will therefore exceed Congress’s enumerated

24

Id. at 921.

25

1 Kenneth Culp Davis & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise 66 (3d ed. 1994).

powers under the Sweeping Clause of Article I. It is well within the original meaning of
“[t]he executive Power” for executive officials to exercise discretion with respect to
minor or ancillary matters in the implementation of statutes, and ordinary law execution
therefore poses no nondelegation problems, but a statute that leaves to executive (or
judicial) discretion matters that are of basic importance to the statutory scheme is not a
“proper” executory statute. Part II applies this principle to many of the issues that have
arisen over the past two centuries. Part III briefly addresses some likely criticisms of my
analysis.
This article is an attempt to resolve the budding conflict between Justice Thomas
and Justice Stevens by uncovering the Constitution’s original meaning. Nothing in this
article should be taken to herald or predict a rebirth of the nondelegation doctrine in the
courts, Congress, or the Executive.26 The forces that ground down the nondelegation
doctrine are still at work, and they are not likely to go away. But those who reject a
meaningful nondelegation doctrine – and that is almost everyone today -- should be open
about their reasons. They should have the grace, as did the Supreme Court in Mistretta,
to declare that their choice “has been driven by a practical understanding that in our
increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems,
Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general
directives . . . .”27 They should not pretend to speak in the name of the Constitution.

I
26

Congress and the Executive long ago abandoned any pretense of concern for nondelegation issues. See
Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1231, 1241 (1994).

27

488 U.S. at 372.

The Constitution does not contain an express “nondelegation clause.” Article I
provides that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the
United States,”28 but there is nothing in the Constitution that specifically states, in terms,
that no other actor may exercise legislative power or that Congress may not authorize
other actors to exercise legislative power.29 Such clauses were known to the founding
generation. The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 famously provided:
In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative department shall
never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them: the executive
shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them: the
judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of
them: to the end it may be a government of laws and not of men.30
The absence of any such provision in the Constitution of 1788/1789,31 or of any provision
more directly targeted at the delegation of legislative power, is the basic fact that drove
Justice Stevens in American Trucking to deny that the Constitution must be read to
prohibit all delegations.
This search for an express nondelegation clause, however, reflects a fundamental
misunderstanding of the American Constitution. Because this misunderstanding is so
pronounced and so widespread, even among those who ought to know better, it is

28
29

U.S. Const. art. I, §1, cl. 1.
See Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 315, 322 (2000).

30

Mass. Const. of 1780, art. XXX. Similar provisions appeared in the Virginia Constitution of 1776, the
Georgia Constitution of 1777, and the Vermont Constitution of 1786. See Gary Lawson & Patricia
Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43
Duke L.J. 267, 291-92 (1993).

31

This strange locution is necessary because different parts of the Constitution took effect at different
times between June 21, 1788 and mid-1789. See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, When Did the
Constitution Become Law?, 77 Notre Dame L. Rev. – (2001) (forthcoming ).

necessary to root it out by rehearsing some oft-ignored first principles of American
constitutionalism.

A.

The government of the United States is a government of limited and enumerated
powers.32 The Constitution does not limit a pre-existing national government.33 Rather,
it creates, defines, and empowers – and in that process limits – a new national
government. More precisely, it creates, defines, and empowers – and in that process
limits – the constituent institutions of a new national government. The Constitution never
grants power to the national government as a unitary entity. Every power grant in the
Constitution is a grant to some specific institution or actor within the national
government. The principle of enumerated power is really a principle of enumerated
institutional power rather than a principle of enumerated national power simpliciter. Any
action by any institution or person in the national government must originate in some
explicit or implicit constitutional grant of power to that institution or person.34
Accordingly, the correct constitutional question with respect to delegation is not,
“Does any clause of the Constitution expressly or implicitly forbid the delegation of

32

Although some Antifederalists disputed that the principle of limited and enumerated powers applied to
the national government, the Federalists uniformly and consistently maintained that the national
government’s institutions had to trace their powers to a defined constitutional source. See Lawson &
Granger, supra note XX, at 315-16.
33

The Constitution does to some extent limit pre-existing state governments. See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. I,
§ 10.

34

And, of course, such action must not run afoul of any express or implied constitutional limitation on the
exercise of the relevant power.

legislative authority?” The correct question is, “Does any clause of the Constitution
expressly or implicitly permit the delegation of legislative authority?”
One cannot answer this question without some understanding of the
Constitution’s most basic grants of power. Each of the first three articles of the
Constitution begins by vesting a particular kind and quantity of power in a specific
institution. Article I vests “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted”35 in Congress, which
expressly confirms that Congress can exercise only those legislative powers referenced
elsewhere in the Constitution rather than any imaginable powers that bear the label
“legislative.” By contrast, Articles II and III begin with vesting clauses that do not
contain any “herein granted” limitation: “[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a
President of the United States of America,”36 and “[t]he judicial Power of the United
States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish.”37 Accordingly, the President and the federal
courts are granted all of the powers that come within the ordinary understanding of,
respectively, the executive and judicial powers. If an activity falls within the ordinary,
late-eighteenth century understanding of “executive” or “judicial” power, the President or
the federal courts are presumptively authorized to engage in that activity.
One must say “presumptively authorized,” because the Constitution contains
much more than these basic vesting clauses. Other provisions of the Constitution qualify,
limit, or expand the range of activities permitted by the vesting clauses, and still others
regulate the kinds of inferences that one can make from the basic power grants. Consider
35

U.S. Const. art. I, § 1, cl. 1.

36

Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.

the powers of the President. To the extent that the executive power includes the power to
appoint lesser governmental officials, 38 that power is defined and qualified by the
Appointments Clause,39 which gives the Senate a vital role in the appointment of
principal officers, the Congress a vital role in specifying the method of appointment for
inferior officers, and the federal courts and department heads a potential role in the
appointment of inferior officers. To the extent that the executive power might be thought
to include a general superintendence over foreign affairs,40 that power is qualified by
numerous grants of power to Congress concerning the maintenance, regulation, and use
of military forces.41 To the extent that one might try to infer an executive power to draw
resources from the treasury without legislative authorization, that inference is foreclosed
37

Id. art. III, § 1.

38

I do not explore here the extent to which eighteenth-century audiences would have understood an
appointment power to be part and parcel of the executive power. For some provocative indications that
they would not, see Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 Yale L.J. 1725, 1770, 1776-77
(1996).
39

Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (providing that the President “shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the
supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise
provided for, and which shall be established by Law; but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment
of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads
of Departments”).
40

Again, I do not explore the extent to which the executive power includes a foreign affairs component.
For a brilliant introduction to the question, see PRAKASH & RAMSEY; Michael D. Ramsey, The Myth of
Extraconstitutional Foreign Affairs Power, 42 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 379 (2000).
41

See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations
. . . and with the Indian tribes”); id. art. I, §8, cl. 10 (giving Congress power “[t]o define and punish Piracies
and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations”); id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11
(giving Congress power “[t]o declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules
concerning Captures on Land and Water”); id. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (giving Congress power “[t]o raise and
support Armies”); id. art. I, § 8, cl. 13 (giving Congress power “[t]o provide and maintain a Navy”); id. art.
I, § 8, cl. 14 (giving Congress power “[t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and
naval Forces”); id. art. I, § 8, cl. 15 (giving Congress power “[t]o provide for calling forth the Militia to
execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions”); id. art. I, § 8, cl. 16 (giving
Congress power “[t]o Provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such
Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving the States respectively, the
Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed
by Congress”).

by the Appropriations Clause.42 To the extent that the ordinary understanding of the
executive power would not include a veto power over proposed legislation, the
Presentment Clauses defines the executive power to include a qualified veto.43 To the
extent that the executive power more generally does not include power to make laws, that
understanding is modified in the contexts that implicate the Commander-in-Chief
Clause,44 which in conjunction with the Vesting Clause authorizes the President to wage
war in accordance with international norms, including the norm permitting occupying
armies to govern conquered territory.45 And to the extent that the power of law execution
that lies at the heart of the executive power might be thought to contain a general power
to suspend laws, the Constitution imposes on the President the duty to “take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed.”46

42

Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (“No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations
made by Law”).

43

Id. art. I, § 7, cls. 2-3 (describing the constitutional requirement of presentment to the President and
providing for a presidential veto, subject to an override by a two-thirds majority of each house of
Congress). The veto power must be viewed as part of the executive power under the Constitution because
the Article I vesting clause states that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress
. . . .” Id. art. I, §1. Because the veto power is not vested in Congress, it cannot be considered legislative
for purposes of the Constitution and therefore must be understood to be part of “[t]he executive Power.”
Even if that usage, in the abstract, would not conform to ordinary understandings, the Constitution can
establish its own internal rules of interpretation..
44

U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the
United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United
States”).

45

For a detailed discussion of this presidential power – and its oft-ignored limits – see Gary Lawson &
Guy Seidman, The Hobbesian Constitution: Governing without Authority, 95 Nw. U.L. Rev. 581 (2001).
It does not matter whether the power to govern occupied territory stems from the Commander-in-Chief
Clause, the Vesting Clause, or some combination of the two. If pressed, I would say that it stems from the
Vesting Clause, and that the Commander-in-Chief power is simply a confirmation of the chain of authority
of military command (so that Congress cannot argue, for instance, that its powers to raise armies and
declare war also carry the power to direct military operations).
46

U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.

Whatever additional powers, limitations, or qualifications the Constitution
provides, however, the President’s most basic power derives from the Vesting Clause of
Article II. The core element of the executive power is the power to carry into effect – to
execute – the laws of the United States.47
On some occasions, execution of the law requires little or no discretion. If a
statute instructs the Secretary of the Treasury to place on a list of persons eligible for
pensions all names that were previously forwarded to Congress by the Secretary,48 the
Secretary does not have discretion to alter the list; the list’s content is controlled by the
statute. Sometimes, law execution consists merely of dotting “i’s” and crossing “t’s.”
Often, however, execution requires a degree of discretion. If the statute
concerning pensions does not specify the precise manner in which the Secretary must
enter names on the list of eligible recipients, the Secretary has discretion to fill in that
gap. Discretion, of course, is always bounded; the Secretary surely does not have
discretion to write the names in invisible ink. But within large bounds established by the
statute’s meaning and background legal conventions, the person charged with executing
the law has some measure of ability to determine the forms and manner of execution.
Executive discretion can even involve matters concerning the meaning and
content of a statute. Very few statutes can resolve every possible issue that can arise in
every possible application. When courts decide questions involving such statutes, it is an
47

PRAKASH. As this discussion suggests, the precise contours of the “executive Power” are, to put it
mildly, less than crisp. The term surely did not have a precise meaning in the late eighteenth century in
many contexts. See Flaherty, supra note XX, at 1790-91. That does not mean, however, that the term is
empty. A term need not be precisely determinate in order to have meaningful content. It is not difficult,
for example, to establish that the “executive Power” includes the power to execute the laws and to conduct
foreign affairs, though it may be quite difficult to establish the precise extent and proper forms for exercise
of those powers.
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See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 164 (1803).

ordinary incident of the judicial power. Similarly, when the President makes decisions in
the face of ambiguous statutes, it is an ordinary incident of the executive power. The
ordinary operations of the executive and judicial powers necessarily entail some measure
of discretion in application and interpretation. Indeed, this familiar “gap-filling” role is
virtually constitutive of the executive and judicial functions.49
But there comes a point where “interpretation” or “application” shades into
legislation. Suppose that Congress enacts a “statute” that consists of blank verse or
gibberish (or even Robert Bork’s famous inkblot). The marks on the page of the Statutes
at Large literally make no sense. If a court or the President tried to implement such a
“statute,” on the theory that any enactment by Congress must have some identifiable
meaning, they would not be engaged in “interpretation” in any useful sense of that term.
They would simply be making up a law – that is, exercising legislative power in the guise
of interpretation. As used in the Constitution, the term “executive power” does not mean
anything done by an executive actor, and the term “judicial power” does not mean
anything done by a court. These are terms with real content.50 The courts and the
President exceed their enumerated powers by purporting to give meaning to gibberish just
as surely as they would exceed their enumerated powers by directly inserting their own
texts into the Statutes at Large.
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That is why there has traditionally been a distinction between mandamus (or actions in the nature of
mandamus) and other legal remedies against putative illegal executive action. Mandamus is appropriate
precisely in those circumstances in which the actor had no significant discretion – as Chief Justice Marshall
so painstakingly explained in Marbury. See 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 171-73.

50

Because the point is so often misunderstood, it is worth repeating, see supra note XX, that “real
content” does not always mean “clear content.” Such repeated disclaimers are sadly necessary because of
the widespread and pernicious idea that formalism as a mode of constitutional inquiry somehow depends on
finding clear understandings about governmental lines in concrete historical sources. For an articulate
expression of this deeply rooted fallacy, see Flaherty, supra note XX, at 1734, 1736, 1773.

Suppose now that Congress enacts a law forbidding “all transactions in interstate
commerce that fail to promote goodness and niceness,” with no further explanation or
contextual clarification. These words are not literally gibberish, but they are so vacuous
that any attempt to implement this law would in essence amount to creation of a new law.
If a court tried to give the statute effect in an adjudication, it would not be engaging in
“interpretation” and therefore would not be exercising the judicial power. The statute
leaves so much undetermined that it would constitute an act of legislation to attribute any
meaning to it. Similarly, if the President tried to implement the statute, the President
would have to give it some construction. But again, that would not constitute the kind of
“interpretation” that is within the scope of the executive power. It would be an exercise
of legislative power. The President would be making the law.
The Constitution clearly – and one must even say obviously – contemplates some
such lines among the legislative, executive, and judicial powers.51 The vesting clauses,
and indeed the entire structure of the Constitution, otherwise make no sense. The
Constitution does not merely create the various institutions of the federal government; it
vests, or clothes,52 those institutions with specific, distinct powers. The Constitution
reflects a separation of powers in addition to a separation of personnel. 53
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See Marci A. Hamilton, Representation and Nondelegation: Back to Basics, 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 807,
807 (1999) (“The language of the Constitution would seem to prescribe a bright-line doctrinal approach.
For its application, all it would seem to require is a set of definitions – ‘lawmaking’ and ‘enforcement’ –
that can be applied to each legislative or executive action, respectively, to determine constitutionality”).
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See Steven G. Calabresi, The Vesting Clauses as Power Grants, 88 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1377, 1380-82
(1994).
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The separation of personnel, of course, is also extremely important to the Constitution’s structure. See
Steven G. Calabresi & Joan L. Larsen, One Person, One Office: Separation of Powers or Separation of
Personnel?, 79 Cornell L. Rev. 1045 (1994).

This obvious point was well understood, and often discussed, by the founding
generation and subsequent legal actors.54 The famous Massachusetts Constitution of
1780, which was quoted earlier,55 assumes a real, functional difference among the
legislative, executive, and judicial powers, even if it is not able or willing to specify
precisely what that difference might entail. Madison similarly spoke of the need to
discriminate among “the several classes of power, as they may in in their nature be
legislative, executive, or judiciary,” 56 which clearly manifests a belief in real distinctions
among those powers. Madison elsewhere observed that the task of distinguishing among
these powers is difficult, and perhaps in some contexts impossible:
Experience has instructed us that no skill in the science of government has
yet been able to discriminate and define, with sufficient certainty, its three great
provinces – the legislative, executive, and judiciary . . . . Questions daily occur in
the course of practice which prove the obscurity which reigns in these subjects,
and which puzzle the greatest adepts in political science.57
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It may seem strange to some readers that a self-proclaimed originalist would find it necessary to
apologize for his uses of founding-era materials, but originalism is poorly enough understood to make some
explanation necessary. If the object of originalist inquiry is concrete, subjective understandings – either of
some privileged group of founders or ratifiers or of some more amorphous general public – then careful
exegesis of historical sources becomes the sine qua non of originalist inquiry. If, however, the proper
object of originalist inquiry is something a bit more hypothetical, such as the understanding that the general
public would have had if all relevant information and arguments had been brought to its attention, historical
sources remain relevant and probative but are inconclusive. As long as documents can have meanings that
are latent in their language and structure even if they are not obvious to observers at a specific moment in
time (and it is difficult to have a plausible theory of concepts that does not allow for such a thing), then the
role and relevance of historical sources is more attenuated. I plan to spell out the (limited) role of history in
originalist analysis more fully in a future work. For now, I simply want to emphasize that I do not invoke
these sparse sources as proof of any grand propositions about separation of powers or constitutional design.
They merely indicate the linguistic acceptability of the basic idea, clearly latent in the constitutional
structure,that the basic governmental powers were regarded in the founding era as (for want of a better
phrase) basic governmental powers.
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The Federalist No. 48, at XXX (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (emphasis added).
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But those problems did not prevent Madison from emphasizing “the necessary partition
of power among the several departments as laid down in the Constitution”58 and the
“separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government, which to a certain
extent is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty.”59 The terms
“legislative,” “executive,” and “judicial” meant something to Madison, even if he could
not articulate precisely (or even vaguely) what they meant.
Chief Justice John Marshall expressed similar sentiments in the Supreme Court’s
first extended discussion of the nondelegation doctrine in 1825 in Wayman v. Southard.60
As did Madison, Marshall clearly acknowledged that there were real lines among the
various governmental powers. And as did Madison, Marshall acknowledged that
drawing those lines could be a vexing task:
The difference between the departments undoubtedly is, that the
legislature makes, the executive executes, and the judiciary construes the law; but
the maker of the law may commit something to the discretion of the other
departments, and the precise boundary of this power is a subject of delicate and
difficult inquiry, into which a Court will not enter unnecessarily.61
Despite these definitional problems, Marshall observed that “[I]t will not be contended
that Congress can delegate to the Courts, or to any other tribunal, powers which are
strictly and exclusively legislative.”62
However difficult it may be to distinguish the legislative, executive, and judicial
powers at the margins, the Constitution of 1788-89 clearly places such a distinction at the
58

Id. No. 51, at XX.
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Id.
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23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825). For further discussion of Wayman, see infra XXX.
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Id. at 46.
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Id. at 42.

center of its structure. There are constitutional lines that the executive and judicial
powers may not cross. 63
Thus, the nondelegation doctrine is initially grounded in the principle of
enumerated powers as it applies to Articles II and III of the Constitution. The President
and the courts cannot make law, even in the guise of interpretation, because they have no
enumerated power to do so.64 As Professor David Schoenbrod elegantly put it, “[t]he test
of permissible delegation should look not to what quantity of power a statute confers but
to what kind -- statutes should be permitted to create an occasion for the exercise of
executive or judicial power, but not to delegate legislative power.”65

B.

The next question is whether Congress can cure those constitutional problems by
legislation. Suppose that Congress adds to the organic statute for its hypothetical
Goodness and Niceness Commission an explicit provision declaring that the President or
some administrative body (or perhaps even the courts) “shall promulgate rules to define
the conduct proscribed by this statute.” In light of this provision, if the executive now
defines the conduct that fails to promote goodness and niceness in interstate commerce, it
would seem to be “executing” the law in the most obvious sense of the term by following

63

Of course, there are also lines that the legislative power may not cross. Congress may not, for example,
initiate criminal prosecutions.
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This statement, of course, is subject to the textually grounded exception for presidential governance of
occupied territory during wartime. See supra note XX.
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David Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give It Substance?, 83 Mich. L. Rev.
1223, 1227 (1985).

to the letter the congressional command that the executive assume the role of primary
lawmaker. How can it violate Article II for executive officers to do precisely what a
congressional statute instructs them to do?66 Can Congress make the Article II (and
Article III) problems with vague or meaningless statutes go away simply through
enactment of an additional authorizing statute? Or can all of the constitutional problems
with delegation be circumvented by the simple device of vesting power in state or private
actors who are not limited by the enumerations of power in Articles II and III?
These arguments for delegation can be formulated in two ways. First, one might
say that statutes giving open-ended authority to executive or judicial actors are not
actually delegations, because they simply call for the exercise of executive or judicial
power in carrying out the congressional command to make laws. Second, one might
concede that such statutes are delegations, but insist that the Constitution permits such
delegations, either in general or in certain classes of cases.
The first formulation is clearly wrong. Congress cannot transform lawmaking into
execution (or judging) by the simple expedient of enacting a statute. “The executive
Power” and “[t]he judicial Power” are formal categories, but they have substantive content.
Something is not an exercise of executive power merely because it is carried out by an
executive official; it is executive if it falls within the sphere of activity contained within the
eighteenth-century understanding of “executive Power.”

66

One presumes that this line of reasoning undergirds the position of those who believe that “most broad
delegations satisfy the formal requirements of Article I legislation and that the merits of a nondelegation
doctrine must therefore turn on broad functional considerations . . . .” Peter H. Schuck, Delegation and
Democracy: Comments on David Schoenbrod, 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 775, 776 (1999) (making reference to
comments by Michael Herz).

If one needs support for this obvious proposition: Consider a statute that creates the
position of Attorney General of the United States. Can Congress avoid application of the
Appointments Clause by stating in the statute that the Attorney General is not in fact an
“Officer of the United States”? Clearly not; the term “Officer of the United States” has an
objective content that does not depend on, and cannot be altered by, the terms of statutes.
Similarly, the basic categories of legislative, executive, and judicial power have a content
that is independent of congressional definition. It would not be execution of the law for the
President, on his own initiative, to try to give content to a meaningless statute, and it does
not become execution of the law if Congress purports to authorize it.67 There is a certain
kind and quality of discretion that lies beyond the power of the President and the courts to
exercise. (And by the same token, there is a certain kind and quality of discretion that is so
basic to the powers of the President and the courts that Congress cannot control it.68 )
Statutes that purport to authorize executive and judicial officials to exercise a kind
and quality of discretion that extends beyond the reaches of the executive and judicial
powers are delegations of legislative power. If such statutes are constitutional, they must
be traceable to some grant of power in the Constitution.
Obviously, if the Constitution expressly said, “Congress may delegate legislative
power,” that would be the end of the story. The general categories of legislative,
executive, and judicial power are the baseline, or residuum, against which the rest of the
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See Sartorius A. Barber, The Constitution and the Delegation of Congressional Power 17-19
(1975).
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See Gary Lawson, Controlling Precedent: Congressional Regulation of Judicial Decisionmaking, 18
Const. Comm. – (2001) (forthcoming).

Constitution operates, but the Constitution can establish its own intratextual69 rules even
if those rules fly in the face of traditional understandings of the basic categories.70 There
is no such express delegation clause. The question is whether the power to delegate can
be found in some subtler form.
Consider again the statute prohibiting interstate transactions that fail to promote
goodness and niceness and authorizing the executive to define the conduct that violates
the statute. The basic prohibition is (let us assume) authorized by the Commerce Clause
of Article I, which gives Congress power to “regulate Commerce . . . among the several
States.”71 The ancillary provision instructing the executive (or a state or private actor) to
define the conduct proscribed by the statute, however, is not a regulation of commerce
and thus cannot be authorized by the Commerce Clause. The authorization for such a
statute must instead come, if at all, from the Sweeping Clause of Article I, which grants
Congress power to "make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution" all constitutionally granted powers.72 A number of modern scholars have
indeed invoked this clause as a possible constitutional authorization to Congress to confer
broad discretion on administrators.73 Any others who wish to defend delegations need to
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On the use of “intratextual” arguments for constitutional meaning, see Akhil Reed Amar,
Intratextualism, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 747 (1999).
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See Harold J. Krent, Delegation and Its Discontents, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 710, 736 (1994); Peter M. Shane,
Conventionalism in Constitutional Interpretation and the Place of Administrative Agencies, 36 Am. U.L. Rev.
573, 597–98 (1987); cf. Dan M. Kahan, Democracy Schmemocracy, 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 795, 805 (1999)
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join the bandwagon. If the Sweeping Clause does not in fact authorize Congress to
empower executive (or judicial) agents to make law, there is nothing else in the
Constitution that will do the trick.
The Sweeping Clause, however, is not quite as sweeping as is commonly supposed.
I have elsewhere argued at length, with Patricia B. Granger, that the Sweeping Clause only
authorizes laws that are consistent with underlying constitutional principles of federalism,
separation of powers, and individual rights.74 Although it is impossible to summarize here
the extensive textual, structural, and historical arguments that justify this conclusion, the
Sweeping Clause is so central to the delegation issue that a brief outline of the argument is
necessary.
The Sweeping Clause authorizes laws that are “necessary and proper” for carrying
into execution powers vested by the Constitution in federal institutions. The word
“necessary” was famously construed by Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v.
Maryland75 to mean “convenient, or useful, or essential to another”76 rather than, as
opponents of the Bank of the United States had argued, “indispensably requisite.”77
Marshall was probably correct: one can argue about just how closely executory laws must

deemed 'necessary and proper' for the detailed pursuit of government purposes," but not specifically
discussing the nondelegation doctrine). See generally James O. Freedman, Crisis and Legitimacy: The
Administrative Process and American Government 79 (1978).
74

See Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper" Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional
Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 Duke L.J. 267 (1993).
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17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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Id. at 413.
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Id. at 367 (argument of Mr. Jones).

“fit” the ends that they are designed to serve, but a standard of strict necessity is difficult to
reconcile with other constitutional uses of the term “necessary.”78
The Sweeping Clause, however, requires all executory laws to be both “necessary”
and “proper,” in the conjunctive. As was evidenced by common usages in the late
eighteenth century, the word “proper” is a distinct term with a distinct meaning.79 The term
“proper” was frequently used in eighteenth-century legal discourse, especially discourse
concerning the allocation of governmental powers, to describe power that is “within the
peculiar jurisdiction or responsibility of the relevant governmental actor.”80 It was used in
that fashion in a number of pre-1787 state constitutions81 and in ordinary legal discourse
before and shortly after ratification of the federal Constitution.82 These usages point to a
meaning of the Sweeping Clause that Patricia Granger and I have termed “jurisdictional”:
[F]irst, an executory law would have to conform to the “proper” allocation of
authority within the federal government; second, such a law woul have to be within
the “proper” scope of the federal government’s limited jurisdiction with respect to
the retained prerogatives of the states; and third, the law would have to be within
the “proper” scope of the federal government’s limited jurisdiction with respect to
the people’s retained rights. In other words, under a jurisdictional construction of
the Sweeping Clause, executory laws must be consistent with principles of
separation of powers, principles of federalism, and individual rights.83
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This meaning of the Sweeping Clause finds powerful and cumulative support in statements
from eighteenth- and nineteenth-century legal actors;84 intratextual comparisons with other
constitutional provisions, most notably the Recommendation Clause and the Territories
Clause;85 the language of contemporaneous state constitutions;86 and evidence from the
constitutional design, especially the Federalists’ understanding of the role of the bill of
rights in the constitutional structure.87 In sum,
A jurisdictional interpretation of the Sweeping Clause harmonizes with the
Framers’ conception of limited government, accounts for the otherwise puzzling
explanation offered by advocates of the Constitution for the absence of a bill of
rights, and provides a role for the Bill of Rights, including the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments, that is consistent with almost everything we know about the
Constitution’s design.88
Obviously, I cannot defend this construction of the Sweeping Clause in detail in
this article. One does not need to accept all of that construction’s possible implications in
order to conclude that the Sweeping Clause does not authorize delegations of legislative
power. One needs only to conclude that legislation, in order to be “proper,” must operate
within rather than without the structural scheme established by the rest of the Constitution.
That is a very hard claim to rebut, and I know of no one who has seriously tried to do it.
The only extended criticism of our construction of the Sweeping Clause has come from
Professor Thomas McAffee,89 and it is too extended for response here.90 But at the risk of
84
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Misreadings, 43 Vill. L. Rev. 17, 46-140 (1998).

oversimplifying a ninety-five page analysis: Professor McAffee’s complaints run primarily
to the implications of our argument for unenumerated rights,91 which is concededly the
most problematic aspect of our argument. To the extent that our interpretation of the
Sweeping Clause merely prevents it from becoming a vehicle for subverting the basic
constitutional structure, I understand Professor McAffee to question its significance92 but
not its soundness.93
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Response is also difficult because much of our disagreement with Professor McAffee involves questions
of methodology. Professor McAffee ably demonstrates that few, if any, of the founders subjectively
understood the Sweeping Clause to have all of the implications that we claim for it. If the search for
original meaning consists primarily of a search for concrete historical understandings, Professor McAffee’s
criticisms, at least of those parts of our argument that concern the relationship between the Sweeping
Clause and the bill of rights, have much force. If, however, original meaning is an objective, hypothetical
construct that represents the meaning that the Constitution would have had to a fully-informed public
audience in possession of all relevant facts and arguments, see supra note XX, then our construction of the
clause, which is based primarily on structural inferences, is much stronger.
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to our analysis in the context of federalism claims. See Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United
States v. Lopez, 1995 Sup. Ct. Rev. 125, 201 (doubting that one can advance the ball by framing
arguments in terms of “proper” principles of federalism if one must resort to other constitutional principles
to define what counts as “proper”). The short answer is that a trivial reading of the Sweeping Clause is
enough to sustain the present argument about delegation – and indeed most arguments for which the
Sweeping Clause is relevant. Proponents of delegation must find in the Sweeping Clause sufficient
authorization to permit Congress to delegate legislative authority. If the word “proper” serves no function
other than to provide a textual objection to the use of the Sweeping Clause to undo the Constitution’s
intricate scheme of limited institutional powers, that is function enough. One must, of course, employ
ordinary tools of analysis to determine the contours of that intricate scheme, and in that sense the Sweeping
Clause does not perform any of the heavy lifting. But as to whether this understanding of the Sweeping
Clause is trivial, one can only answer: Would that it were. I will stop obsessing about the Sweeping Clause
when people stop using it as justification for everything from delegations of legislative power, see supra
note XX, to the regulation of home-grown wheat, see Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), to statutes
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May Congress Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 Yale L.J. 1535 (2000).
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Professor Evan Caminker has raised, in passing, some objections to what he terms the “revisionist”

The bottom line is actually quite simple: Congress cannot use the Sweeping Clause
to authorize executive or judicial lawmaking if such a statute would not be a “proper”
means for carrying into execution governmental powers. Specifically, if a fully informed
eighteenth-century audience would have viewed a statute purporting to authorize an
executive agent to make laws as “improper,” then Congress does not have the enumerated
power to circumvent the Constitution’s basic Article II and Article III limitations on
executive and judicial activity.
There is not the slightest doubt that a statute delegating legislative power would not
be “proper” and hence would not be authorized by the Sweeping Clause, for the same
reasons that Congress cannot delegate power by labeling it execution. The Sweeping
Clause, as with all of the other power grants in the Constitution, is a limited rather than
unlimited grant. Congress can enact laws to implement federal powers, but only if those
laws are consistent with, inter alia, a “proper” distribution of powers among federal

account of the Sweeping Clause. See Evan H. Caminker, Shifting the Balance of Power? The Supreme
Court, Federalism, and State Sovereign Immunity, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 1127, 1138 n.47 (2001). Professor
Caminker’s (concededly preliminary) objections are three-fold. First, he argues that “ ‘proper’ clearly
modifies ‘for carrying into execution’ rather than the ‘laws’ themselves, and thus syntactically serves a
teleological function.” Id. That is untrue, as can be seen from substituting into the Sweeping Clause the
Lawson/Granger definitions of “necessary” and “proper”: “Congress shall have power . . . . [t]o make all
Laws which shall be teleologically fitted and jurisdictionally appropriate for carrying into Execution”
federal powers. The subject of the Sweeping Clause is not “Laws,” but rather “Laws . . . for carrying into
Execution” federal powers; it makes no difference whether the adjectives come before or after the word
“Laws.” Second, he argues that anything substantive that is allegedly provided by the Sweeping Clause is
subsumed within the broader notion of McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) that all
federal laws must “consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution,” id. at 421. See Caminker, supra.
That is a restatement of the objection that our construction of the Sweeping Clause is trivial. See supra
note XX. Finally, he argues that “the Court as well as statespersons focusing on the term ‘proper’ as used
in the Necessary and Proper Clause have consistently employed the term in its more natural, teleological
sense.” Caminker, supra. We never claimed that our interpretation of the Sweeping Clause was consistent
with precedent. Nor did we argue that all usages during the founding era conformed to our understanding;
we claimed only that our usage was prevalent enough to be linguistically plausible. See Lawson &
Granger, supra note XX, at 292-93, 298. We then relied on textual and structural arguments to show that it
was the best construction.

institutions. The Sweeping Clause incorporates the basic constitutional structure; it does
not offer a vehicle for circumventing it.
Additional evidence, if any is needed, that the Sweeping Clause embodies a basic
constitutional principle against delegation of legislative powers, can be found in the history
and purposes of the Constitution’s structural arrangements. Professor Mike Rappaport has
recently marshaled these considerations in defense of a powerful restatement of the
nondelegation doctrine.94 His evidence is compelling95 but superfluous. Once one
recognizes that the Sweeping Clause permits Congress to implement but not to subvert the
Constitution’s basic structure, there is nothing in the Constitution that can be read generally
to authorize the delegation of legislative power.96
Accordingly, the prohibition on delegation of legislative power is not merely a freefloating expectation of the founding generation.97 It is textually embodied in the
requirement that Congress’s executory laws respect a “proper” allocation of governmental
powers. Thus, far from authorizing broad delegations, the Sweeping Clause is in fact a
crucial textual vehicle through which the specific contours of the nondelegation doctrine
are constitutionalized.98 The background principles that define the “proper” jurisdictional
sphere of Congress and other federal actors thus constrain the extent to which Congress can
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create alternative federal lawmaking institutions. Congress simply lacks the enumerated
power to authorize other actors to make law.
What about delegations to state officials or private parties? Delegations to those
actors do not seem directly to raise Article II or Article III problems. Can Congress
therefore delegate its powers to these actors with impunity? A full answer to this question
would require a separate article, but it is enough for now to say the following: as far as
implementation of federal law is concerned, the Constitution vests “[t]he executive Power”
in the President. Accordingly, all execution of federal law must ultimately be controlled by
the President, at least through the ability to veto actions that do not conform to presidential
instructions.99 Even if one can somehow skirt the Appointments Clause problems that are
caused by authorizing enforcement of federal law by nonfederal actors, it is constitutionally
impossible for Congress to vest executive authority without in some way implicating the
President’s powers under Article II. There is accordingly no escape from the operation of
the Article I/Article II nondelegation principle.

99

There is a huge academic debate about the existence of the so-called “unitary executive.” A great many
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As for delegations to state courts: as long as review is available in Article III courts,
the Article I/ Article III nondelegation principle continues to govern. A full treatment of
this issue thus implicates the perennial debate about the extent of federal court jurisdiction
over state decisions construing federal law. That is a swamp that that we will mercifully
avoid for today.100
The only vehicle through which Congress could authorize delegations is the
Sweeping Clause. If a “proper” law under that clause requires Congress to exercise its
legislative power, which it does, then Congress cannot avoid the nondelegation doctrine by
authorizing federal, private, or state actors to make federal law. The Constitution’s delicate
allocation of governmental powers cannot be unraveled by statute. The Framers were not
that stupid.

C.

Even if the Constitution does contain a nondelegation principle, however, there
remains the problem of determining when grants of discretion to administrators or judges
constitute delegations of legislative authority. Administrators and judges, after all, are
constitutionally capable of exercising, respectively, Article II "executive Power" and
Article III “judicial Power,” and those powers surely include some ability to exercise
discretion. When does discretion cross the line from executive or judicial to legislative
authority?
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The difficulty of drawing this line – a difficulty that was acknowledged by Madison
and Marshall, among others – drives much of the suspicion of a constitutionally meaningful
nondelegation doctrine. Justice Scalia, who in his academic guise toyed with the idea of a
reinvigorated nondelegation doctrine,101 reconsidered that position when it required
formulating a concrete, judicially enforceable standard. In his dissent in Mistretta, Justice
Scalia fully agreed with the majority’s view that the Sentencing Reform Act is not
unconstitutional “because of the lack of intelligible, congressionally prescribed standards to
guide the Commission.”102 Doctrinally, Justice Scalia’s agreement with the majority rested
on a straightforward reading of precedent,103 but he made clear that he regards the degree
of discretion to be vested in administrators as essentially a political question that cannot (at
least in the normal run of cases) be evaluated by courts:
But while the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation is unquestionably a
fundamental element of our constitutional system, it is not an element readily
enforceable by the courts. Once it is conceded, as it must be, that no statute can be
entirely precise, and that some judgments, even some judgments involving policy
considerations, must be left to the officers executing the law and to the judges
applying it, the debate over unconstitutional delegation becomes a debate not over a
point of principle but over a question of degree.104
And for Justice Scalia, to say that it is something other than a matter of principle is to say
that it is not something for courts to decide.
A plethora of scholars agree that, even if the Constitution contains some abstract
nondelegation principle, it is too indefinite and uncertain to form the basis for constitutional
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doctrine. For instance, Cass Sunstein notes, with characteristic perspicacity, that “[t]he
distinction between ‘executive’ and ‘legislative’ power cannot depend on anything
qualitative; the issue is a quantitative one. The real question is: How much executive
discretion is too much to count as ‘executive’? No metric is easily available to answer that
question.”105 Accordingly, he argues, “the overwhelming likelihood is that judicial
enforcement of the doctrine would produce ad hoc, highly discretionary rulings,”106 to the
point that “[w]ithout much exaggeration, and with tongue only slightly in cheek, we might
even say that judicial enforcement of the conventional doctrine would violate the
conventional doctrine – since it could not be enforced without delegating, without clear
standards, a high degree of discretionary lawmaking authority to the judiciary.”107 Other
scholars have forcefully made similar arguments.108
They have a point. It is one thing to wave the Constitution and rail against
delegations. It is another matter to identify specific instances of impermissible delegation.
My hypothetical Goodness and Niceness Commission statute may be a slam dunk, but is,
for example, section 109(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act equally flawed?
Proponents of a meaningful nondelegation doctrine have produced, over a span of
nearly two centuries, four different methods for giving the doctrine concrete content – one
by Chief Justice John Marshall and three by modern scholars.

105

Sunstein, supra note XX, at 326-27.

106

Id. at 327.

107

Id.

108

See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political Accountability and Delegated Power: A Response to Professor
Lowi, 36 Am. U.L. Rev. 391, 393-403 (1987); Richard B. Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 Am.
U.L. Rev. 323, 324-28 (1987).

1.

The first serious effort to define a nondelegation principle was put forth by Chief
Justice Marshall in 1825 in Wayman v. Southard.109 The State of Kentucky had enacted a
statute providing that plaintiffs in Kentucky courts must accept state bank notes in
satisfaction of their judicial judgments; victorious plaintiffs could not demand payment in
hard currency.110 The plaintiff insisted that this statute did not govern the methods for
executing federal court judgments in Kentucky, which were instead controlled by federal
laws. The Supreme Court agreed with the plaintiff. In 1789, Congress had passed an act
“to regulate processes in the Courts of the United States,” which stated that
until farther provision shall be made, and except where by this act, or other statutes
of the United States, is otherwise provided, the forms of writs and executions,
except their style, and modes of process, in the Circuit and District Courts, in suits
at common law, shall be the same in each State respectively, as are now used in the
Supreme Court of the same.111
This statute established the various state laws as they stood on September 29, 1789, as the
governing law for executing federal judgments. That principle was incorporated into a
1792 enactment, which provided that
the forms of writs, executions, and other process, except their style, and the forms
and modes of proceeding in suits in those of common law, shall be the same as are
now used in the said Courts respectively, in pursuance of the act entitled “an act to
regulate processes in the Courts of the United States,” except so far as may have
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been provided for by the act to establish the judicial Courts of the United States;
subject, however, to such alterations and additions as the said Courts respectively
shall, in their discretion, deem expedient, or to such regulations as the Supreme
Court of the United States shall think proper, from time to time, by rule, to
prescribe to any Circuit or District Court concerning the same.112
In view of this statute, the Court concluded that the Kentucky bank-note statute, which was
adopted after September 29, 1789, did not govern federal executions. The federal statute
concerning executions adopted only those state laws in existence on September 29, 1789.113
Nor, said the Court, do subsequent state enactments apply to federal court processes of their
own force; the state laws are relevant only to the extent that they are incorporated by
federal statute.114 Therefore, the post-1789 Kentucky statute did not apply to execution of
federal judgments.
The defendant who sought application of the Kentucky statute countered that the
1792 federal law was unconstitutional, because the provisions permitting federal courts to
make unspecified “alterations,” “additions,” and “regulations” to existing law governing
executions delegated legislative power to the courts. The Supreme Court did not formally
decide this issue for two reasons. First, “the question respecting the right of the Courts to
alter the modes of proceeding in suits at common law . . . is not the point on which the
Judges at the circuit were divided, and which they have adjourned to this Court.”115
Second, because the Court soundly rejected the idea that Kentucky statutes could govern
federal court processes of their own force, the Kentucky bank-note statute could apply only
if there was a valid federal statute that made it applicable. The defendant therefore needed
112
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the 1792 Process Act to be valid in order to win the case, and indeed needed it to
incorporate post-1789 state laws – which would, of course, raise even more serious
delegation problems than did the provisions for judicial alterations of the form of
execution.116 Thus, the defendant would lose the case whether or not the Court invalidated
the 1792 Process Act.
Although the Court therefore did not need to pass on the constitutionality of the
Process Act, Chief Justice Marshall nonetheless penned a lengthy dictum on the
nondelegation doctrine that still stands as the Court’s most sophisticated treatment of the
issue.
Marshall began by observing that “[i]t will not be contended that Congress can
delegate to the Courts, or to any other tribunals, powers which are strictly and exclusively
legislative.”117 He continued with the following intriguing and important observation:
But Congress may certainly delegate to others, powers which the legislature may
rightfully exercise itself. Without going farther for examples, we will take that, the
legality of which the counsel for the defendants admit. The 17th section of the
Judiciary Act, and the 7th section of the additional act, empower the Courts
respectively to regulate their practice. It certainly will not be contended, that this
might not be done by Congress. The Courts, for example, may make rules,
directing the returning of writs and processes, the filing of declarations and other
pleadings, and other things of the same description. It will not be contended, that
these things might not be done by the legislature, without the intervention of the
Courts; yet it is not alleged that the power may not be conferred on the judicial
department.118
This is a crucial passage that contains a fundamental insight about constitutional structure.
Each department of the national government can only exercise its enumerated powers; the
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federal courts, for instance, can only exercise “[t]he judicial Power.”119 This division of
power, however, does not mean that each and every possible function of government must
uniquely be assigned to one department or institution.120 It is possible that certain functions
might fit within more than one kind of power. Consider the adjudication of disputes. This
function certainly fits comfortably within the meaning of the “judicial Power,” so assuming
that a particular dispute is within the enumerated heads of jurisdiction of the federal courts,
there is no constitutional problem with courts performing that function. But that activity
can also fit within the meaning of the “executive Power.” There is nothing constitutionally
wrong with having executive officials determine, for instance, claims for veterans benefits
under a statute defining terms of eligibility. Congress could, if it chose, entrust those
determinations to federal courts (whose “judicial Power” would enable it to receive that
grant of authority), or it could leave those determinations to executive officials (whose
“executive Power” would permit exercise of the granted power). Congress could even
choose to make those determinations itself in the form of private bills. Thus, the function
of adjudicating disputes concerning government benefits could be performed by any of the
three departments of the national government.
The Constitution uniquely assigns certain powers to each department. Sometimes,
it uniquely assigns certain functions to one power; only the courts (or a jury), for instance,
can adjudicate guilt in a criminal case. But the Constitution does not always uniquely
assign any given function to one power. Accordingly, it is not a per se violation of the
119
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nondelegation doctrine for Congress to authorize another actor to perform a function or
make a decision that Congress could make for itself. The real question is whether
Congress is attempting to authorize another actor to exercise power that exceeds that
actor’s enumerated constitutional powers. If making ancillary decisions about the
operation and meaning of a statute is a valid exercise of the “executive Power,” which it
surely is, then Congress does not violate the nondelegation doctrine by authorizing such
activity. And if regulating the processes for bringing and pursuing cases falls within the
“judicial Power,” then nothing prevents Congress from authorizing the courts to enact such
regulations.121 That is essentially what Chief Justice Marshall said in Wayman. Perhaps
one could quarrel with his implicit premise that the “judicial Power” includes anything
beyond the bare power to decide a case in accordance with governing law,122 but the form
of his argument is true to the constitutional structure.
Even accepting Marshall’s method of framing the issue, one may still question
whether specifying the form of payment for judgments is truly an exercise of “judicial
Power”123 or instead is an aspect of court process that is so bound up with substantive
policymaking that it must constitute an exercise of legislative power. Marshall
acknowledged the force of this question – and acknowledged it very powerfully by not
directly answering it. Some aspects of court procedure seem more clearly judicial than
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Again, one can break this question up into two separate questions: can courts fill in the details of a
legislative scheme, and can courts impose their own scheme even in the absence of any legislative
provision?

legislative. For example, the precise form of notice to judgment debtors that their property
is subject to levy is something that legislatures may but need not decide; if the “judicial
Power” includes any aspect of court procedure, this procedure surely falls within it. On the
other hand, “[t]o vary the terms on which a sale is to be made, and declare whether it shall
be on credit, or for ready money, is certainly a more important exercise of the power of
regulating the conduct of the officer . . . .”124 Is it therefore outside the boundaries of the
“judicial Power”? An answer of “yes” would leave courts with no mechanism for
enforcing judgments if Congress did not provide one, though that is hardly an unthinkable
result. Marshall suggested that “[a] general superintendence over this subject seems to be
properly within the judicial province, and has been always so considered,”125 though he
acknowledged that “in the mode of obeying the mandate of a writ issuing from a Court, so
much of that which may be done by the judiciary, under the authority of the legislature,
seems to be blended with that for which the legislature must expressly and directly provide,
that there is some difficulty in discerning the exact limits within which the legislature may
avail itself of the agency of its Courts.”126
In other words, policing the lines between the legislative and judicial (or between
the legislative and executive) powers can produce hard cases, and the facts of Wayman v.
Southard may present one very good example. As Marshall pointedly put it,
The difference between the departments undoubtedly is, that the legislature
makes, the executive executes, and the judiciary construes the law; but the maker of
the law may commit something to the discretion of the other departments, and the
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precise boundary of this power is a subject of delicate and difficult inquiry, into
which a Court will not enter unnecessarily.127
All of which leaves us with the task of distinguishing legislative from executive
from judicial power. Surely there are easy cases: the President cannot set tax rates,128 the
courts cannot initiate prosecutions,129 and Congress cannot put people in jail.130 But how
would Chief Justice Marshall have us address the difficult cases?
Marshall put forth his ultimate methodology for resolving delegation issues in one
cryptic sentence: “The line has not been entirely drawn which separates those important
subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself, from those of less
interest, in which a general provision may be made, and power given to those who are to
act under such general provisions to fill up the details.”131 The line between legislative
power and executive or judicial power thus turns, in close cases, on whether the function in
question involves “important subjects” or matters of “less interest.” The precise form of
notice to debtors is not important enough to require congressional resolution. The form of
payment for judgments is more important than the form of notice, though perhaps also not
important enough to require congressional resolution. But a decision, for instance, to
exempt personal firearms from execution132 is not something that Congress could leave to
the courts (nor is it something that courts could devise on their own). That determination
127
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just looks too important – too legislative – to be left to judicial (or executive) actors. In
other words, after much sturm und drang, we end up with a test for delegations that says, in
essence, “Congress must make whatever decisions are important enough to the statutory
scheme in question so that Congress must make them.”
As constitutional tests go, this one certainly sounds pretty lame – not to mention
absurdly self-referential.133 It is no surprise that a rule-of-law devotee like Justice Scalia
flees from it as a vampire flees garlic. Surely, one might think, the constitutionality of
legislative authorizations to executive and judicial actors cannot turn on something as
ephemeral, and ultimately circular, as a distinction between “important subjects” and
matters of “less interest.” Perhaps the search for a manageable nondelegation principle
must continue.
Subsequent Supreme Court cases, however, have never significantly elaborated
on Chief Justice Marshall’s formulation. The Court’s next major pronouncement on the
nondelegation doctrine did not come until 1892 in Field v. Clark.134 Congress by statute
provided for duty-free importation of such items as molasses, sugar, coffee, and tea, but
specified that the statute's free-trade provisions with respect to any specific country must be
suspended by the President if he determined that such country imposed "reciprocally
unequal and unreasonable" trade restrictions on American exporters.135 The plaintiff
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claimed that this provision unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to the President.
The Court rejected the delegation challenge in a lengthy discussion, part of which reads as
follows:
That Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the President is a
principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the
system of government ordained by the Constitution. The act . . . under
consideration is not inconsistent with that principle. It does not, in any real sense,
invest the President with the power of legislation . . . . Congress itself determined
that the provisions of the act . . . permitting the free introduction of such articles,
should be suspended as to any country producing and exporting them that imposed
exactions and duties on the agricultural and other products of the United States,
which the President deemed, that is, which he found to be, reciprocally unequal and
unreasonable. Congress itself prescribed, in advance, the duties to be levied,
collected and paid . . . while the suspension lasted. Nothing involving the
expediency or the just operation of such legislation was left to the determination of
the President . . . . [W]hen he ascertained the fact that duties and exactions,
reciprocally unequal and unreasonable, were imposed upon the agricultural
products of the United States . . . , it became his duty to issue a proclamation
declaring the suspension, as to that country, which Congress had determined should
occur. He had no discretion in the premises except in respect to the duration of the
suspension so ordered. But that related only to the enforcement of the policy
established by Congress . . . . Legislative power was exercised when Congress
declared that the suspension should take effect upon a named contingency. What
the President was required to do was simply in execution of the act of Congress. It
was not the making of law. He was the mere agent of the law-making department
to ascertain and declare the event upon which its expressed will was to take
effect.136
Three Justices dissented, maintaining that the statute "certainly extends to the executive the
exercise of those discretionary powers which the Constitution has vested in the law-making
department."137
The statute in Field is an instance of a widespread phenomenon known as
contingent legislation, which is central to nondelegation analysis and requires some brief
explanation. Every law has an effective date. Laws can take effect immediately, on some
136
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specific future date, or on the happening of some future event that may or may not be
certain to occur. If a law takes effect only on the happening of some future event that is
not certain to occur (or is not certain to occur at a specific time), it is contingent
legislation.
Courts have long allowed Congress to make the effectiveness of laws depend on
contingencies and to allow other actors to determine whether those contingencies have
been satisfied. The first Supreme Court case expressly to permit this practice was Cargo
of the Brig Aurora v. United States.138 Beginning in 1809, Congress passed a series of
statutes restricting trade with Great Britain and France and subjecting cargo shipped in
violation of the statute to forfeiture. The 1811 version of the statute provided that the
trade prohibition was to be in effect unless the President declared by proclamation that
the relevant countries – in this case Great Britain -- had ceased to violate the neutral
commerce of the United States.139 Appellant's cargo was seized under the statute. The
primary issue in the case concerned the date on which Congress intended the statute to
take effect,140 but counsel for appellant also argued that the entire statute was
unconstitutional because "Congress could not transfer the legislative power to the
President. To make the revival of a law depend upon the President's proclamation, is to
give to that proclamation the force of a law."141 The Supreme Court dismissed the
argument in one sentence: "[W]e can see no sufficient reason, why the legislature should
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not exercise its discretion in reviving the act of March 1st, 1809, either expressly or
conditionally, as their judgment should direct."142
The Court was correct to approve the general practice of contingent legislation.
Normally, a statute’s effective date will be a calendar date, but there is no evident reason
why that effective date can’t be determined by some event other than celestial motions –
such as legislation that takes effect only upon occurrence of natural disasters. Once the
statute identifies a contingent event as the trigger for effectiveness, someone must
determine in any given case whether the event has occurred (just as someone must
determine whether the relevant calendar date has occurred if the statute prescribes a
calendar date). That someone will be either an executive agent or a judicial agent: the
interpretation of the contingency (what counts as a natural disaster? how high does the
water have to rise before it constitutes a flood?) and the ascertainment of whatever facts
the contingency depends upon (how high did the water actually rise?) are core executive
or judicial functions.
The statute in The Brig Aurora (and in Field v. Clark) gave the President the
power to determine whether a stated contingency had occurred, but the contingency itself
was specified in the statute. That is, Congress determined the conditions under which the
statute would be effective, but left it to the executive to determine whether those
conditions were satisfied. The statute did not say that the act would be effective if and
when the President decided, on the basis of standardless discretion, that it would be a
good idea. It is true that the facts underlying the contingency in The Brig Aurora -whether Great Britain or France was violating the neutral commerce of the United States
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-- were perhaps less easily ascertained than calendar dates or natural disasters, 143 but the
uncertainties do not seem more severe than in the routine questions that form the
everyday work of executive and judicial agents.
Field v. Clark presents a qualitatively different variation on this theme. The
determination of the “facts” that drove the contingency in that case – whether foreign
countries imposed “reciprocally unequal and unreasonable” trade restrictions on
American exporters – seems to involve more of an exercise in judgment than does the
ascertainment of calendar dates or the identification of hostile action by British warships.
The tariff statute in Field resolves less and leaves more to the imagination than did the
statute in The Brig Aurora. That is no doubt why the decision in Field was 6-3 rather
than 9-0.
So assume that Field presents a case about which reasonable people could
disagree. How did the Court propose to resolve that reasonable disagreement? It never
told us. The majority repeatedly asserted that the President was merely following the
legislative will by finding “facts” concerning unequal and unreasonable trade restrictions.
It never explained how one would establish that such determinations are exercises of
executive rather than legislative power. Nor did the dissent explain why it placed those
determinations on the legislative side of the line.
Nonetheless, one can fairly glean the methodology that underlies both opinions.
For the majority, the legislative specification of the relevant contingency was the
“important subject” for determining the effectiveness of the statute. Determining whether
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foreign countries actually imposed unequal and unreasonable trade restrictions was a
matter of “less interest” and thus appropriate for executive or judicial resolution; it
involved some degree of policymaking, but not so much as to push it into the
“legislative” category. The dissent construed the amount of policymaking involved
differently. Put another way, the majority and the dissent disagreed about whether giving
more precise definition to the phrase “reciprocally unequal and unreasonable” was a
decision that was so important in the context of the statutory scheme that Congress had to
make it. The majority and the dissent were both implicitly employing the vague, circular
“test” set out by Chief Justice Marshall 67 years before.
Later cases tacitly employed the same methodology without additional
elaboration. A good illustration is Buttfield v. Stranahan.144 The case involved a statute
that was on the books for ninety nine years before its repeal in 1996: the Tea Importation
Act. Act of Mar. 2, 1897.145 As codified just before its repeal,146 the Act instructed the
Secretary of Health and Human Services147 each year to "appoint a board, to consist of
seven members, each of whom shall be an expert in teas, and who shall prepare and submit
to him standard samples of tea."148 In accordance with the board of experts'
recommendations, the Secretary was instructed to "fix and establish uniform standards of
purity, quality, and fitness for consumption of all kinds of teas imported into the United
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States" and to deposit samples of these standards in the customhouses of various ports of
entry.149 Tea importers were required to submit samples of their product for comparison
with the standard samples kept at the customhouses.150 The imported samples were then
tested "by a duly qualified examiner,"151 who would test "the purity, quality, and fitness for
consumption of the . . . [imported tea samples] according to the usages and customs of the
tea trade, including the testing of an infusion of the same in boiling water and, if necessary,
chemical analysis."152 The statute declared it unlawful to import into the United States
"any merchandise as tea which is inferior in purity, quality, and fitness for consumption to
the standards [kept at the customhouses] . . . ."153 In sum, for nearly a century, Congress
provided that no imported tea could enter the United States unless federal tea-tasters
decided that it measured up to pre-selected standard samples.
In 1904, the Court addressed a challenge to this statute on the ground that it
delegated legislative power to the administering officials. The Court tersely upheld the
statute:
The claim that the statute commits to the arbitrary discretion of the
Secretary . . . the determination of what teas may be imported, and therefore in
effect vests that official with legislative power, is without merit. We are of opinion
that the statute . . . but expresses the purpose to exclude the lowest grades of tea,
whether demonstrably of inferior purity, or unfit for consumption, or presumably so
because of their inferior quality. This, in effect, was the fixing of a primary
standard, and devolved upon the Secretary . . . the mere executive duty to effectuate
the legislative policy declared in the statute . . . . We may say of the legislation in
this case, as was said of the legislation considered in Field v. Clark, that it does not,
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in any real sense, invest administrative officials with the power of legislation.
Congress legislated on the subject as far as was reasonably practicable, and from
the necessities of the case was compelled to leave to executive officials the duty of
bringing about the result pointed out by the statute.154
As in Field, the Court announced a result without much by way of explanation. The Court
appeared to be saying that specifying the standard was the “important subject,” while filling
in its meaning was a matter of “less interest.” There is nothing in Stranahan that advances
the ball beyond the formulation of Wayman v. Southard.
Two historical watersheds for the nondelegation doctrine occurred in 1928 and
1935, but neither contributes significantly to an understanding of the appropriate
nondelegation principle. J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States155 took the next step
beyond Field v. Clark in the analysis of contingent legislation. Field was a straightforward
case of contingent legislation in which the President had to determine whether the
effectiveness of a statute. But once the President determined that a certain country had
imposed reciprocally unequal and unreasonable trade restrictions on American importers,
the statute then operated of its own force. The statute in Field did not give the President
discretion to suspend the statutory free-trade provisions in the event that a foreign country’s
tariffs were reciprocally unequal and unreasonable, but rather required such suspension
upon the appropriate finding. The regular tariff laws would then take effect, imposing
congressionally-determined tariff schedules on goods imported from the offending nation.
Thus, there were in essence two tariff schedules in place, and the President effectively
determined which tariff schedule would apply by assessing the trade practices of foreign
nations. But in either case the tariff levels were fixed by statute.
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In Hampton, however, the statute authorized to President to alter the amount of a
duty on certain imported merchandise in order to “equalize the . . . costs of production”156
between the United States and exporting foreign nations. The Court upheld the statute
against a nondelegation challenge. The Court stated that the extent to which Congress can
vest discretion in the executive or the courts must be determined “according to common
sense and the inherent necessities of the governmental co-ordination.”157 In oft-quoted
language, the Court explained that “[i]f Congress shall lay down by legislative act an
intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to fix such rates is directed to
conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.”158
Hampton is significant for two reasons. First, its language about “an intelligible
principle” is generally taken as the specification of a new standard for delegation analysis;
modern cases certainly recite the phrase as a mantra. Second, it moves beyond Field by
permitting a scheme in which the President actually adjusts the tariff rates rather than
merely determining whether pre-existing, congressionally-specified tariff schedules will
take effect.
Upon closer examination, however, Hampton may not be as dramatic a
development as is sometimes believed. Methodologically, there need not be an
unbridgeable gap between saying that lawful delegations require an “intelligible principle”
and saying that Congress must deal with “important subjects,” leaving matters of “less
interest” to executive and judicial agents. Both formulations focus, in the normal run of
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cases, on the degree of discretion that statutes grant to executive and judicial actors. There
may, of course, be certain “important subjects” that cannot be addressed by any body other
than the legislature, whether or not an “intelligible principle” is provided, and in those
cases strict adherence to the different formulations might reach different results. But as a
way of describing the inquiry in most cases, Hampton does not move beyond, but also does
not necessarily fall short of, the analysis in Wayman and subsequent cases.
As for letting the President set tax rates, that sounds like an easy kill for an
originalist nondelegation doctrine. Matters, however, are a bit more complicated than they
may seem. There is no question that setting the level of a tariff is an “important subject[]”
– so important that Congress must set the level itself. The question is whether Congress
effectively sets the level by specifying a standard, such as “equalize the . . . costs of
production,” and then letting the President (or a designee) determine its application. If the
standard lent itself to relatively mechanical calculations, the answer would probably be
“yes.” As any good accountant can verify, however, a phrase like “costs of production”
does not lend itself to mechanical analysis. If the congressionally-prescribed standard in
fact leaves too much unresolved, so that the President is in effect setting the tariff rate, then
the statute is unconstitutional.
For now, it is enough to observe that Hampton may or may not have broken much
new ground doctrinally, and it probably did not break any new ground methodologically.159
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There is one aspect of Hampton, however, that almost surely has led subsequent courts astray. In its
general discussion of contingent legislation, the Hampton Court said that “Congress may feel itself unable
conveniently to determine exactly when its exercise of the legislative power should become effective,
because dependent on future conditions, and it may leave the determination of such time to the decision of
an Executive, or, as often happens in matters of state legislation, it may be left to a popular vote of the
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latter circumstance, according to Hampton, no intelligible principle needs to be provided because the
stipulated condition for the validity of the law is simply the will of the regulated. This doctrine has been
used to validate many statutory schemes in which legislation becomes effective only upon a (standardless)

Neither was any new ground broken in 1935, when the Court for the first (and only)
times invalidated statutes on nondelegation grounds. In Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan160
and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,161 the Court held unconstitutional
various provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act,162 which gave to the President
essentially unconstrained power to approve and prescribe codes of conduct for
industries.163 But while the cases are major historical and doctrinal events, they shed little
light on the proper methodology for analyzing nondelegation problems. The Panama
Refining decision is filled with vague generalities that are entirely consistent with, but do

vote of the regulatory beneficiaries. See, e.g. Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1939) (upholding
provisions of the Tobacco Inspection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 511d (1994), which makes regulation conditional on
the approval of interested tobacco growers); United States v. Rock Royal Co-Operative, Inc., 307 U.S. 533,
577-78 (1939) (upholding provisions of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act, 7 U.S.C. § 608c
(1994), which makes regulation conditional on the approval of certain agricultural producers); United
States v. Frame, 885 F.2d 1119, 1127-28 (3d Cir. 1989) (upholding provisions of the Beef Promotion Act, 7
U.S.C. § 2906(a) (1994), which makes regulation conditional on the approval of beef producers). The
Court has suggested on several occasions that legislation of this sort does not involve any delegation of
legislative authority. See Currin, 306 U.S. at 15 ("So far as growers of tobacco are concerned, the required
referendum does not involve any delegation of legislative authority. Congress has merely placed a
restriction upon its own regulation by withholding its operation as to a given market 'unless two-thirds of
the growers voting favor it.'"); Hampton, 276 U.S. at 407 ("While in a sense one may say that such resident
[who vote on the effectivenss of a law or regulation] are exercising legislative power, it is not an exact
statement, because the power has already been exercised legislatively by the body vested with that power
under the Constitution"). This is simply not true. The effective date of a statute or regulation is an
important part of the law, and allowing an entity other than Congress to fix the effective date is no different
than allowing that entity to fix any of the law's substantive terms. Accordingly, it is best to view the
referendum-of-the-regulated cases as an historically sanctioned exception to the nondelegation principle
that is difficult, if not impossible, to justify on originalist grounds.
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Actually, the specific, and quite limited, authority at issue in Panama Refining was perhaps more
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provisions of the Petroleum Code had accidentally been amended out of existence. See Louis L. Jaffe,
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not elaborate upon, Chief Justice Marshall’s analysis in Wayman.164 Schechter Poultry
contained even less discussion of nondelegation principles than did Panama Refining. The
Court was content (and perhaps properly so) simply to point out that the breadth and depth
of presidential power under the NIRA was essentially unlimited.165
After 1935, the Court essentially abandoned any serious nondelegation analysis.
Subsequent cases announced the search for an “intelligible principle” and declared it
satisified by any collection of words that Congress chose to string together.166 That
remains the law today. The modern Court is not prepared, on any articulated standard, to
determine whether statutes vest such broad discretion in executive or judicial actors that
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See, e.g., 293 U.S. at 421:
The Congress manifestly is not permitted to abdicate, or to transfer to others, the essential
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directly. The Constitution has never been regarded as denying to the Congress the necessary
resources of flexibility and practicality, which will enable it to perform its function in laying down
policies and establishing standards, while leaving to selected instrumentalities the making of
subordinate rules within prescribed limits and the determination of facts to which the policy as
declared by the legislature is to apply. Without capacity to give authorizations of that sort we should
have the anomaly of a legislative power which in many circumstances calling for its exertion would
be but a futility. But the constant recognition of the necessity and validity of such provisions, and the
wide range of administrative authority which has been developed by means of them, cannot be
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An especially comic example is American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90 (1946), which
concerned provisions of the Public Utility Holding Company Act that call upon the SEC to forbid
reorganization plans that “unfairly or inequitably” distribute voting power. The statute was challenged on
nondelegation grounds, and the Court responded by explaining that, out of the statute’s background and
context, “a veritable code of rules reveals itself for the Commission to follow in giving effect to the
standards of § 11(b)(2). These standards are certainly no less definite in nature than those speaking in other
contexts in terms of 'public interest,' 'just and reasonable rates,' 'unfair methods of competition' or 'relevant
factors.' ” 329 U.S. at 105. The “code of rules” that emerges from phrases like “relevant factors” is truly a
wonderous thing to behold. Of course, lest one think that the Court was actually serious, the opinion
immediately added that “[t]he judicial approval accorded these 'broad' standards for administrative action is
a reflection of the necessities of modern legislation dealing with complex economic and social problems.”
Id.
.

they effectively permit the exercise of legislative rather than executive or judicial power.167
As far as the courts are concerned, no one has improved upon, or even elaborated upon,
Chief Justice Marshall’s 1825 declaration that the Constitution requires Congress to make
whatever decisions are important enough so that the Constitution requires Congress to
make them.

2.

Very few modern scholars defend a vigorous nondelegation doctrine that would
police the lines among the legislative, executive, and judicial powers. Even fewer have
sought to give concrete content to the Constitution’s nondelegation principle. A number of
scholars, however, have sought to provide a methodology for resolving the many difficult
cases that such a line-drawing exercise inevitably raises.168
Professor David Schoenbrod has thoughtfully addressed these issues in an
important book169 and several antecedent articles.170 Professor Schoenbrod correctly
167

Apart from Justice Thomas’ brief concurring statement in American Trucking, the only modern
opinion that expressed any serious interest in the nondelegation doctrine was Justice Rehnquist’s
concurring opinion in Industrial Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
That case is discussed elsewhere in this article. See infra XX. For now, it is enough to observe that Justice
Rehnquist had very little to say about the methodology for exploring nondelegation issues, but his scant
comments fit in quite nicely with Chief Justice Marshall’s analysis. See , e.g. 448 U.S. at 675 (“the
language of § 6(b)(5) gives the Secretary absolutely no indication where on the continuum of relative safety
he should draw his line. Especially in light of the importance of the interests at stake, I have no doubt that
the provision at issue, standing alone, would violate the doctrine against uncanalized delegations of
legislative power”).
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Obviously, others have also suggested ways to reinvigorate the nondelegation doctrine. But none of
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for determining when legislative power has been improperly delegated. See Schoenbrod, supra note XX, at
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David Schoenbrod, Power without Responsibility: How Congress Abuses the People through
Delegation (1993). I have elsewhere (favorably) reviewed that book, see Gary Lawson, Who Legislates?,
1995 Pub. Int. L. Rev. 147, and much of my discussion here is based on that review.

locates the nondelegation doctrine in the principle of enumerated powers.171 Accordingly,
he recognizes that “[t]he crucial task is therefore to determine when the statutory discretion
of executive or judicial actors reflects an impermissible delegation of legislative authority
or a permissible exercise of executive or interpretive authority.”172
For Professor Schoenbrod, the crucial distinction for this purpose is between
statutes that set rules and statutes that set goals. A valid statute must set forth a rule of
conduct and not merely a goal or set of goals to which executive or judicial actors must
strive. The act of legislation is not completed simply by announcing an ambition; the
Constitution requires the legislature to specify how and to what extent those ambitions
should be realized. “[T]he statute itself must speak to what people cannot do; the statute
may not merely recite regulatory goals and leave it to an agency to promulgate the rules
to achieve those goals.”173 Such “goals statutes” are per se unconstitutional. A rules
statute, by contrast, “demarcates permissible from impermissible conduct”174 and therefore
constitutes valid legislation.
That is fine as far as it goes. A goals statute, which prohibits nothing but merely
empowers executive or judicial actors to define unlawful conduct, is certainly
unconstitutional under any plausible understanding of the nondelegation doctrine. The
problem, of course, is to distinguish permissible rules statutes from impermissible goals
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statutes. That distinction turns on the substance of statutes rather than their form. Very
few rules are entirely opaque; most leave some room for interpretation and discretion in
application. This feature of rules does not necessarily raise nondelegation problems,
because interpretation is an appropriate executive and judicial function. A statute that
appears to state a rule, however, may nonetheless be a goals statute, in Professor
Schoenbrod’s parlance, if the stated “rule” has so little meaning independent of the
interpreter that articulation of the rule requires an act of legislation rather than
interpretation. How does one tell in any given case whether a statute that takes the form of
a rules statute actually defines enough permissible and impermissible conduct to qualify as
an act of legislation?
Professor Schoenbrod produces numerous examples of rules and goals statutes, but
he provides no precise mechanism for making those determinations. Nor is it reasonable to
expect one. The distinction between rules and goals statutes is designed to track the
underlying constitutional distinction between norms requiring interpretation (executive and
judicial action) and norms requiring legislation (legislative action). By their nature, those
distinctions require judgment that must be exercised in the context of each unique statutory
scheme and the background assumptions that lie behind it.175 Moreover, one must pay
close attention to the character as well as the quantity of conduct that a given statute
regulates. A statute can surely be a rules statute if it defines the large outlines of
permissible or prohibited conduct, even if executive and judicial actors must fill in those
outlines to provide a complete picture of the legal regime.
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On the importance of context and background understandings, see Schoenbrod, supra note XX, at 784,
788.

In other words, one might fairly say that a rules statute must regulate the “important
subjects” in any given statutory scheme, but that the act of interpretation can involve
determination of ancillary matters of “less interest.” Or, in still other words, a statute is a
permissible rules statute if it resolves those matters that are sufficiently important to the
statutory scheme at issue so that the Constitution requires the statute to resolve them – all
of which brings us back to Chief Justice Marshall’s circular formulation in Wayman v.
Southard.
A third formulation for a nondelegation principle has been advanced by Professor
Martin Redish. Although Professor Redish does not profess to be an originalist,176 his
approach to separation of powers issues is generally consistent with originalism (at least
as I practice it).177 Accordingly, his suggested formulation for a nondelegation principle
warrants scrutiny.
Drawing on conceptions of political legitimacy and accountability, Professor
Redish proposes what he calls the "political commitment" principle:
[A]ccountability for lawmakers constitutes the sine qua non of a
representative democracy. It therefore seems reasonable to demand as the
prerequisite for legislative action some meaningful level of normative political
commitment by the enacting legislators, thus enabling the electorate to judge its
representatives . . . . Statutes that fail to make such a commitment, instead
effectively amounting to nothing more than a mandate to an executive agency to
create policy, should be deemed unconstitutional delegations of legislative power.
A reviewing court will be able to determine whether the necessary political
commitment has been made by deciding whether the voters would be better
informed about their representatives' positions by learning how their representatives
voted on the statute.178
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Professor Redish's "political commitment" principle explicitly draws attention to the
importance to the electorate of the issues involved in the statute. Legislators need not make
every conceivable choice embodied in a statute, but they must make those choices that are
necessary for the political responsibility contemplated by the Constitution's scheme of
representation. Because Professor Redish advocates what he terms “pragmatic
formalism,”179 the degree of detail required in any case “may vary, depending on pragmatic
considerations,”180 though the basic requirement of political commitment “imposes a floor,
below which Congress may not fall under any circumstances.”181
How does one tell in any given case, however, whether a particular statute provides
enough information to the electorate about their representatives to satisfy the political
commitment principle? As Professor Redish’s examples demonstrate,182 the answer surely
will vary with the statutory scheme at issue. One must carefully examine the issues raised
by a particular regulatory regime and ask which of those issues are central from a
policymaking perspective (and therefore highly relevant for evaluating representatives) and
which are peripheral. In other words, the test must involve examining whether the issues
left unresolved by the statute concern "important subjects" or matters "of less interest" -which brings us right back to Chief Justice Marshall's circular formulation in Wayman v.
Southard.
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Actually, there are two potentially important differences between Professor
Redish’s political commitment principle and Chief Justice Marshall’s formulation. First,
Professor Redish distinguishes – as Marshall, Schoenbrod, and I do not – between the kind
of discretion that is permissible in executive and judicial actors; Professor Redish would
give the nondelegation doctrine broader bite in the former context. That dispute raises
fundamental issues about the nature of the judicial power and the role of Congress in
regulating that power that cannot be addressed here.183 Second, and more pertinently here,
Professor Redish defines the importance of an issue in terms of its ability to inform the
electorate about its representatives’ positions. Chief Justice Marshall never identified
precisely what he meant by “important subjects,” but it probably involved the centrality of
the topic to the particular regulatory scheme at issue rather than the electorate’s likely
perceptions of Congress. It is, I suppose, possible to imagine a circumstance in which
Professor Redish would deem an issue important under the political commitment principle
while Chief Justice Marshall would have regarded it as a matter of “less interest,” or vice
versa. In practice, however, these two understandings of importance will converge in most
cases, and perhaps even in all significant cases.
Sartorius Barber, in his important and illuminating study of delegation, advanced a
formulation that strongly resembles the political commitment principle put forth by
Professor Redish. For Barber, statutes vesting authority in others are “necessary and
proper,” and therefore lawful executory statutes, “as long as it can be said that Congress
has arrived at a clear policy decision among salient alternatives and that the delegations in
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question are instrumental to such decisions.”184 Perhaps it would be possible, on close
analysis, to discern differences between this formulation and Professor Redish’s
pragmatically formalist political commitment principle, but any such differences are
probably too subtle to concern us here.
Thus far, all roads have led back to Chief Justice Marshall’s seemingly unsatisfying
formulation for improper delegations. In essence, the formulations examined thus far all
reduce, in the end, to the proposition that Congress must make whatever decisions are
sufficiently important to the statutory scheme at issue so that Congress must make them. In
light of these prior efforts, I have elsewhere proposed my own formulation of the
appropriate nondelegation principle: “Congress must make whatever policy decisions are
sufficiently important to the statutory scheme at issue so that Congress must make
them.”185 In other words, Chief Justice Marshall was right all along, and rather than wind
our way back to him indirectly, we might as well take the freeway. The line between
legislative and executive power (or between legislative and judicial power) must be drawn
in the context of each particular statutory scheme. In every case, Congress must make the
central, fundamental decisions, but Congress can leave ancillary matters to the President or
the courts. One can try to find alternative ways to express the distinction between
fundamental and ancillary matters, such as focusing on case-resolving power or
demonstration of political commitment or choices among salient alternatives, but in the
end, one cannot really get behind or beneath the fact that law execution and application
involve discretion in matters of “less interest” but turn into legislation when that discretion
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extends to “important subjects.” That is the line that the Constitution draws, and there is no
escape from it.
In Part III, I will briefly consider some likely objections to my nondelegation
analysis, but two obvious objections to Chief Justice Marshall’s – and my -- vague and
circular formulation require attention right now: first, that it is vague, and second, that it is
circular.
The charge of circularity is most easily dealt with. As I have explained
elsewhere,186 many issues of structural constitutionalism end up in a circle. An officer of
the United States for purposes of the Appointments Clause is an employee who is
important enough to be considered an officer. A principal officer for purposes of the
Appointments Clause is an officer who is important enough to be considered principal.
These kinds of circular formulations are inevitable whenever categorizations depend on
substance rather than form. And the lines among the legislative, executive, and judicial
powers are substantive rather than formal lines; “[e]xecutive Power,” for instance, does not
simply describe everything performed by an executive official. Whenever line-drawing
involves an element of judgment, one cannot eliminate the need for judgment by a verbal
formulation; one can only conceal or obscure it. Accordingly, Marshall’s and my
formulation for the nondelegation doctrine is not truly circular. Rather, it points directly to
the appropriate inquiry, however difficult that inquiry may prove to be in particular cases.
The charge of vagueness in the formulation is more plausible at first glance, but
also dissolves on close analysis. It is true that the distinction between “important subjects”
and matters of “less interest” will sometimes give rise to hard cases on which reasonable
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people can disagree.187 It is even true that judges may sometimes come to different
conclusions about the relative importance of various issues within the context of a statutory
scheme based on their prior commitments or predilections.188 That simply means,
however, that the Constitution sometimes requires that hard decisions by made by fallible
humans, which is scarcely a startling conclusion. It does not mean, as Professor Redish has
claimed, that “there is no textual, theoretical, or historical basis on which to exclude
delegations of so-called unimportant policy choices to unaccountable administrators from
Article I’s requirement that the legislative power be exercised by Congress.”189 Quite to
the contrary, text, theory, and history all point to the conclusion that matters of “less
interest” are within the constitutional purview of the executive and judicial power, and that
delegating such decisions to those departments is therefore not a delegation of legislative
power.
As to whether these potentially hard decisions can properly be made by various
agents, such as courts: the relevant question is not whether the task is hard or subject to
abuse on political grounds, but whether it is literally impossible. The existence of
numerous easy cases, some of which are described in Part II, should dispose of this
objection summarily. As Professor Redish elegantly put it while responding to a similar
objection to his “political commitment” principle:
Admittedly, it would be absurd to suggest that invocation of the political
commitment principle would magically end all uncertainty and unpredictability in
the measurement of statutes’ constitutionality. It would be equally absurd,
however, to demand such certainty from constitutional doctrine. Few, if any, of the
Supreme Court’s modern constitutional doctrines meet such a standard, yet
187
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somehow our system of judicial review manages to function. One may reasonably
demand no more from the doctrinal standard by which we measure the
constitutionality of legislative delegation.190
II

Because the correct nondelegation principle requires judgment in the context of
each particular statutory scheme, it is difficult to make useful generalizations about
application of that doctrine. The best that one can do is to offer some examples that can
serve as guideposts.
Start with some easy cases. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 makes it
unlawful “[t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . ,
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the [Securities and Exchange] Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.”191 This is a naked
delegation. The statute prohibits nothing by itself, but simply makes illegal whatever the
Securities and Exchange Commission prohibits by rule. This is not even an instance of a
vague legislative standard that the agency (and ultimately the courts) must interpret.
Rather, the statute straightforwardly authorizes the agency to make law. That is obviously
something that is sufficiently important to the statutory scheme in question so that
Congress must do it. Put another way, the instruction to the agency to establish primary
rules of conduct is not “necessary and proper” for carrying into effect federal powers.
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Every other test for delegations would reach the same result. In Chief Justice
Marshall’s terminology, prescribing the standard for illegal conduct is an “important
subject” that cannot be left to executive and judicial actors. In Professor Schoenbrod’s
terminology, this is a classic instance of a “goals statute”: Congress sets a goal of
prohibiting market manipulation but specifies no means by which that goal should be
achieved. In Professor Redish’s terminology, Congress has clearly failed to make any
meaningful normative commitment beyond a general dislike for manipulation.192 However
one chooses to verbalize the nondelegation principle, this statute clearly fails it.
The case would be more interesting if the statute directly prohibited “any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance,” without tying the prohibition to rules
promulgated by the SEC. In that circumstance, the question would be whether the
legislative standard was so vague that its implementation by the agency or the courts would
exceed the limits of the executive and judicial powers (and Congress’ instructions to the
agency or courts to implement the statute would exceed the limits of Congress’ authority
under the Sweeping Clause). The answer depends on how much content the statute can be
given by conventional tools of statutory interpretation. For instance, if one believes that
legislative history is a legitimate tool of interpretation,193 a very thick legislative history
might enable one to flesh out the statute’s meaning. Or, as Professor Schoenbrod has
strongly emphasized,194 statutes often draw meaning from background understandings. If,
for instance, the term “manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance” was a term of art
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with a well understood core of meaning, implementation of that term might involve nothing
more than ordinary executive or judicial interpretation.
To the best of my knowledge, no conventional source of interpretation could
provide much meaning to the term “manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance” as it
appears in the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. In that circumstance, implementation by
executive or judicial actors would amount to an act of law creation, which is
constitutionally forbidden.
The same analysis applies to the various statutes instructing the Federal
Communications Commission to grant broadcast licenses “if public convenience, interest,
or necessity will be served thereby.”195 Unless that phrase was given content by
background assumptions in 1934, which it pretty clearly was not,196 the statute leaves the
agency (and the court on review of the agency) with so much discretion that it crosses the
line from interpretation to lawmaking. An agency that gave content to the phrase “public
interest, convenience, or necessity” would not be engaging in “interpretation” in any
meaningful sense of that term. The specification of concrete criteria for licensing is a
matter sufficiently important to a licensing scheme so that Congress must address it.
Congress can permit agencies and courts to implement those criteria through interpretation,
but it cannot permit them to create the criteria through lawmaking.
Again, all of the various tests for delegations would reach the same conclusion.
Chief Justice Marshall would surely have regarded establishment of criteria for licensing as
an “important subject” that needed to be resolved by the statute. To the extent that the
195
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phrase “public interest, convenience, or necessity” does not establish criteria but merely
empowers the agency to establish criteria, the law would be unconstitutional. Professor
Schoenbrod would quickly identify the Communications Act as a “goals statute” that fails
to specify the means by which, or the extent to which, the goals should be achieved.
Professor Redish would readily conclude that Congress has failed to make a meaningful
normative commitment and that the “statute does nothing more than delegate both
policymaking and implementational authority to the . . . agency.”197
The Clean Air Act provisions that were upheld in American Trucking suffer from
similar defects. Those statutes prohibit nothing until the Administrator of the EPA
exercises his or her judgment by specifying emissions rules. The statute sets out the
general goal of promoting health and welfare, but that does not come close to the line of
legislative power. Congress has authorized the EPA to legislate, but it has not provided a
statute that the executive or the courts can implement. In the language of the various
nondelegation tests: Without some interpretable measure of guidance about pollution
levels, the Clean Air Act is a “goals statute” that makes no meaningful normative political
commitment because it fails to address an “important subject” that the Constitution requires
Congress to address. Thus, however vague any of these standards may be at the margins,
there are plenty of real-world cases in which there is no room for reasonable doubt about
the proper application of the nondelegation doctrine.
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Now let’s look at some cases that are not quite so easy. Consider, for instance,
section 6(b)(5) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act,198 which was at issue in
Industrial Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute.199 With respect to
workplace exposure to toxic substances, the statute instructs the Secretary of Health and
Human Services (through the Administrator of the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration) to “set the standard which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible,
on the basis of the best available evidence, that no employee will suffer material
impairment of health or functional capacity even if such employee has regular exposure to
the hazard dealt with by such standard for the period of his working life.”200 The dispute in
Industrial Union focused on the phrase “to the extent feasible.” Justice Powell insisted that
the phrase required the agency to insure that the benefits of any safety standard exceeded
the costs.201 Justice Marshall and three other dissenters argued (as did the agency) that the
statute required the agency to reduce risks until the next marginal reduction would bankrupt
the relevant industry.202 A three-Justice plurality did not address the phrase’s meaning, as
it held that other portions of the statute required the agency to find that it was regulating a
significant risk before setting any standards.203 Justice Rehnquist concluded that the phrase
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Id. at 639-45. The plurality focused on section 3(8) of the statute, which defines an occupationa safety
and health standard as “standard which requires conditions, or the adoption or use of one or more practices,
means, methods, operations, or processes, reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful
employment and places of employment.” 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1994). This is unpromising language from
which to glean a threshold requirement of a “significant risk.” Indeed, the plurality reached its conclusion

“to the extent feasible” was entirely vacuous and rendered the statute as written
unconstitutional. Absent that phrase, the statute “would have required the Secretary . . . to
set the permissible level of exposure at a safe level or, if no safe level was known, at
zero,”204 which would have been a “clear, if somewhat unrealistic, standard.”205 The
addition of the phrase “to the extent feasible,” however, left it to the agency to decide
whether, and to what extent, economic costs, scientific uncertainty, and even political
reality rendered a standard “infeasible.” And that, Justice Rehnquist reasoned, is precisely
what the nondelegation doctrine forbids.
As far as it goes, Justice Rehnquist’s assessment of section 6(b)(5) is entirely
correct. Nothing in the language, structure, context, or legislative history of the statute
provides any determinate content to the phrase “to the extent feasible.” Indeed, as Justice
Rehnquist ably demonstrated, that was precisely the phrase’s attraction to Congress.206 The
statute is, as he put it, an “obvious example of Congress simply avoiding a choice which
was both fundamental for purposes of the statute and yet politically so divisive that the
necessary decision or compromise was difficult, if not impossible, to hammer out in the
legislative forge.”207 Justice Rehnquist did not specifically explain the methodology he
employed to reach his ultimate conclusion, but the emphasized phrase indicates that his
reasoning was in line with that of Chief Justice Marshall: determining the appropriate

by way of the avoidance doctrine, on the ground that alternative constructions would raise questions under
the nondelegation doctrine. Id. at 646.
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trade-off between safety and other concerns is the paradigmatic “important subject[]” in the
context of this statutory scheme.
Professor Schoenbrod, for his part, would have no trouble concluding that section
6(b)(5), as written, is a quintessential “goals statute,” and he would therefore agree with
Justice Rehnquist that the statute is unconstitutional. Similarly, this statute presents the
classic situation in which Congress deliberately failed to make a meaningful normative
commitment, and section 6(b)(5) would fails Professor Redish’s test as well.
A more interesting question, however, arises if we consider section 6(b)(5) shorn of
the weasel phrase “to the extent feasible” (which I will henceforth call “the revised section
6(b)(5)”). In that circumstance, the statute would require the Secretary to adopt a standard
for any given toxic substance “which most adequately assures, on the basis of the best
available evidence, that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional
capacity.” With no feasibility requirement to provide wiggle room, one might think that
the revised section 6(b)(5) requires elimination of all workplace risks from toxic substances
regardless of the consequences. Such a statute would perhaps be an act of lunacy, but no
one would find it to be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative powers. Without the
feasibility requirement to introduce elements other than safety into the analysis, the agency
would have a clear mandate in any circumstance in which the best available evidence
suggests a safety risk at some specific level of exposure.
But what about cases in which there is no relevant evidence concerning safety risks
at specific exposure levels? That was precisely the situation in Industrial Union. The
agency had plenty of evidence to suggest that benzene was potentially harmful at high

doses (above 25 ppm),208 and a standard that forbade exposures above that level would
have been unchallengeable on any ground. The tough questions in the case, however,
involved exposure levels below 10 ppm – a level at which the agency had no credible
evidence of health effects one way or another.209 It would be possible to re-draft the
revised section 6(b)(5) to require a workplace ban on any substance for which there is
evidence of harmful effects at any exposure level. That is precisely the effect of the
famous Delaney Clause of the Food and Drug Act, which forbids the use of food additives
that are not demonstrably safe and which then provides that “no food additive shall be
deemed to be safe if it is found to induce cancer when ingested by man or animal, or if it is
found, after tests which are appropriate for the evaluation of the safety of food additives, to
induce cancer in man or animals.”210 If the revised section 6(b)(5) contained a similar
provision, then the agency would have had no choice but to ban workplace exposure to
benzene at all levels, including levels at which there was no evidence concerning health
effects. Such a statute would pass muster under any plausible understanding of the
nondelegation doctrine. But the hypothetical version of section 6(b)(5) under discussion
here – the actual statute without the “to the extent feasible” language – contains no
specification of how the agency is to handle scientific uncertainty. More technically, the
statute gives the agency no guidance on how to draw dose-response curves. With respect
to benzene in the early 1970s, OSHA could plot points at 25 ppm and 100 ppm that both
showed significant adverse health effects from workplace exposure. Those points,
however, afford no basis for drawing conclusions about health effects at lower exposure
208
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levels absent some theoretical grounds for making good assumptions about the shape of
benzene’s dose-response curve.211 Many substances have threshold levels below which
they have no ill effects. Others, such as radiation, are harmful at high levels and
affirmatively beneficial at low levels. If benzene behaves like radiation – and the OSHA in
the early 1970s had no reason to believe that it did not – then the optimal standard may well
have been to forbid high-level (above 25 ppm) exposure but to require some measure of
low-level exposure. The agency in this case could not determine the appropriate standard
without either much better evidence212 or much better guidance from the statute. Nothing
in section 6(b)(5), with or without the “to the extent feasible” language, tells the OSHA
how to draw dose-response curves in the face of scientific uncertainty, and the statute
therefore fails to give directions in those circumstances in which “the best available
evidence” is wholly inconclusive.
In Chief Justice Marshall’s terms, one very “important subject[]” in the context of
the Occupational Safety and Health Act is how to draw dose-response curves for toxic
substances in the absence of any credible evidence. Should all doubts be resolved in favor
of assuming some kind of linear or near-linear dose-response relationship all the way to the
origin?213 Should the agency instead hesitate to wipe out industrial civilization without
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Actually, absent some fairly strong theoretical assumptions, the two points do not even provide a basis
for making judgments about health effects between 25 ppm and 100 ppm or above 100 ppm. I assume that
epidemiologists could justify the necessary assumptions to make those judgments.
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The agency in 1970 had no way to get better evidence. Human tests would raise serious ethical and
practical problems, and meaningful low-dose tests would take decades. Low-dose animal tests would raise
the so-called “megamouse” problem, and high-dose animal tests could at most tell the agency what it
already knew: high dose benzene exposure is harmful. The agency had to make policy based solely on the
two available points.
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affirmative proof of harm at all relevant exposure levels? These are the crucial questions in
any circumstance in which scientific evidence is inconclusive, and they are precisely the
questions that section 6(b)(5) does not address – with or without the empty feasibility
requirement. All of the various tests for delegation should invalidate the revised section
6(b)(5).
Ratemaking statutes that authorize agencies to set rates that are “just and
reasonable” are also tricky. Professor Schoenbrod has discussed the proper delegation
treatment of ratemaking statutes at length,214 and my analysis is essentially in accord with
his. As I have elsewhere explained,
If the statute simply instructs the agency to go forth and do what it thinks is good,
the statute is a raw delegation of legislative authority. But the phrase "just and
reasonable rates" has a long history and can be used as a term of art with a
specific meaning. The traditional understanding of rate regulation is that a
regulating agency must permit a utility to earn enough revenue to cover the
utility's operating costs plus a return on capital sufficient to attract investors in a
competitive capital market . . . . [I]f the phrase "just and reasonable rates" is a
specific enough term of art to include a method for measuring the utility's rate
base, such as the amount actually spent (or perhaps prudently spent) on plant, then
Professor Schoenbrod would allow the statute to stand. So would I, though the
question is a close one, because even when the statute (explicitly or implicitly)
specifies the form of ratemaking and the method for determining the rate base, the
agency still will have considerable discretion in allocating costs across time
periods, choosing discount rates, estimating the risk of investment in the firm, and
so forth. Nonetheless, the central policy choice--to engage in cost-of-service
ratemaking using historical costs (or prudent historical costs) to determine the rate
base and functioning capital markets to determine the rate of return--seems to
have been made by the statute. On the other hand, if the ratemaking agency can
choose its own standard for the rate base (or the rate of return), Professor
Schoenbrod would invalidate the statute, and so would I. There is no knockdown
argument for any of these results--which proves only that hard cases are hard.215
exposure levels and negative at low exposure levels. A zero standard can easily be more dangerous than a
non-zero standard.
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Professor Redish has not specifically addressed the constitutionality of “just and
reasonable” ratemaking statutes, but I do not see why he could not sign onto this analysis.
The universe of contingent legislation provides a wide range of contexts for
delegation analysis. Contingent legislation is not per se unconstitutional; there is no
reason why Congress cannot make the effect of legislation turn of some event other than
standard celestial motions, and there is no reason why Congress cannot entrust executive
and judicial agents with the implementational task of determining whether those specified
events have occurred. The question is when, if ever, determination of those events passes
beyond the implementational function of executive and judicial agents and instead
becomes lawmaking.
The Supreme Court’s cases actually provide a nice natural progression. The
statute from The Brig Aurora that required the President to determine whether Great
Britain was violating America’s neutral commerce216 clearly passes muster: Congress
made the important decision (and therefore assumed political responsibility for it). The
President has, of course, some measure of discretion in determining whether the actions
of Great Britain amount to violations of neutral commerce, but the extent of that
discretion is no greater than in run-of-the-mill cases involving matters other than
effective dates.
Field v. Clark presents a harder case. The statute in that case authorized the
President to suspend the operation of certain tariff laws (and therefore call into play
others) when foreign countries imposed “reciprocally unequal and unreasonable” trade

216

See supra XX.

restrictions on American exports.217 The question here is whether the quoted phrase had
enough understood content in the late nineteenth century to make the President’s job one
of interpretation rather than lawmaking. There is no formula for making that
determination – which is no doubt why the Court split 6-3 on the question. One would
have to be more steeped than I ever plan to be in nineteenth century trade law in order to
evaluate this statute, though Louis Jaffe was probably correct to describe the statutory
language as “not a formula at all but a bargaining power put into the President’s hands in
his conduct of foreign affairs.”218
J.W. Hampton carries the analysis one step further. In that case, the President was
instructed to alter tariff rates in order to “equalize the . . . costs of production” between
American and foreign goods.219 The question again is whether that that task can draw on
enough background assumptions to make it a reasonably directed act of implementation.
And again, the answer would require serious inquiry into the general understandings
concerning accounting practices in the early twentieth century. If the phrase “costs of
production” had as much content at that time as the phrase “just and reasonable rates,” it is
conceivable that the statute in Hampton was constitutional.
But what about contingent legislation that makes the effectiveness of a law depend
solely on the wishes of another actor rather than on that actor’s determination of some
external fact? Can the “event” that triggers a contingent law be nothing more than, for
instance, the President’s decision?
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Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 56 (1965). See also Barber, supra note
XX, at 60 (doubting whether Field v,.Clark was correctly decided). As to whether the foreign affairs
context might justify a more lenient nondelegation standard, see infra XXX.
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This was the issue actually presented in Clinton v. City of New York220 -- the socalled “line-item veto case.” The Line Item Veto Act221 gave the President the authority,
upon the making of specified determinations, to “cancel in whole”222 certain spending and
tax-benefit provisions of enacted statutes.223 The effect of such cancellations was to
prevent the relevant provisions “from having legal force or effect.”224 Although the parties
in the case extensively briefed the question whether this statute violated the nondelegation
doctrine, the Court decided instead that the statute was an unconstitutional line-item veto in
violation of the lawmaking procedures in Article I, section 7.225 As the dissenting opinions
by Justice Scalia and Justice Breyer pointed out,226 this holding makes no sense. The
statute was not a “line-item veto”; it was a classic piece of contingent legislation. The
effect of the so-called “line-item veto” was simply to make the operation of the statute
depend on presidential action (or inaction), which is no different in principle from the
statutes at issue in The Brig Aurora, Field v. Clark, or any of the countless other instances
of contingent legislation. A true line-item veto would allow the President to sign into law
only portions of a unitary bill enacted by both houses of Congress. The President almost

220

524 U.S. 417 (1998).

221

110 Stat. 1200 (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 691-XXX).

222

2 U.S.C. § 691(a).

223

For a more detailed examination of this statute, see Saikrishna B. Prakash, Deviant Executive
Lawmaking, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1 (1998); RAPPAPORT.
224

2 U.S.C. § 691(e)(4)(B)-(C).

225

524 U.S. at 436-47.

226

See id. at 463-69 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 473-81.

surely does not have that power under the Constitution,227 but that is not the power
conferred by the Line Item Veto Act. Under that statute, the President signs the entire bill
into law, but the effective dates of certain portions of the law are made contingent on
subsequent presidential action. The question is whether the President’s authority to
determine effective dates crosses the line from execution to legislation. That has nothing to
do with the procedures in Article I, section 7 and everything to do with the nondelegation
doctrine.
The dissenting Justices in Clinton v. City of New York found the statute easily
constitutional under the nondelegation doctrine.228 Matters may not be that simple. To
begin with, the statute as enacted only provided for cancellation authority if the President
signed the relevant spending bill into law; the President had no cancellation authority over
spending bills that were enacted over a veto.229 Mike Rappaport has elsewhere argued at
length that this “veto burden” feature of the statute violates the nondelegation doctrine.230
The more pertinent question for this analysis, however, is whether the statute would be
constitutional without the veto burden.
The statute specifies certain procedural formalities with which the President must
comply in order to cancel an item,231 and it specifies certain matters that the President must
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consider in making those determinations,232 but the statute does not make anything other
than the President’s will the basis for cancellation. The Line Item Veto Act was therefore
unlike the tariff statutes discussed above. In those cases, the statutes specified external
events that would determine the operation of the statutes but left it to the President to
determine whether those events had in fact occurred. In some of those cases, the “events”
were vague enough to give the President considerable discretion, and perhaps even enough
discretion to invalidate the statutes. In the Line Item Veto Act, there is no specified event.
It is as though the statute said, “This Act shall take effect unless the President declares that
it should not.”
Congress cannot leave the effective date of a statute to the unfettered discretion of
the President or anyone else. It is one thing to let the President determine the existence vel
non of a state of affairs on which the statute is contingent. It is another matter simply to let
the President determine the effective date of a law on his own. Justice Scalia, in his
dissenting opinion, acknowledged that the permissibility of this kind of presidential
decisionmaking was dubious as an original matter, but he thought that history had come to
accept some measure of presidential discretion to impound funds with congressional
approval.233 That may be, but perhaps that is history’s problem.
Concededly, my position is harder to defend than it might seem. After all, in The
Brig Aurora, Congress was in one sense “delegating” the determination of the statute’s
effective date to the British: if they stopped boarding our ships, then all would be well. If
Congress can “delegate” to the British – or to nature – in that manner, why can’t Congress
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simply let the President, or someone else, directly determine a law’s effective date? Why is
the President’s decision a qualitatively different event than the actions of the British Navy?
I confess that there is no knock-down answer. If, for instance, a statute’s effective
date turned on whether the President formally recognized a foreign country, that would
seem to be a straightforward example of permissible contingent legislation. It is hardly
obvious that constitutional differences should turn on whether the President makes a
decision about effective dates or makes a decision about some other matter that collaterally
determines effective dates. Nonetheless, the distinction between execution and lawmaking
is, as Madison and Chief Justice Marshall recognized,234 often quite ephemeral. If the
President simply decides on an effective date, he is making a law. If he determines the
existence vel non of an external fact, he is executing a law (provided that the determination
does not require so much discretion that it crosses the line into lawmaking). If he makes
some decision other than the effective date that consequentially establishes the effective
date, the lines get very blurry. All of which proves once again that hard cases are hard.
There are certain arrangements that appear to be blatantly unconstitutional
delegations but which on close examination turn out to be permissible exercises of
legislative power. These include statutes giving wide authority to executive agents to
manage public property and statutes creating territorial legislatures.
Approximately one-third of the land mass of the United States is owned by the
federal government. Congress generally does not specify the precise uses to be permitted
at each location, the times and circumstances of such uses, or other rules for the
management of federal lands. Instead, Congress grants essentially unlimited discretion to
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executive agents to determine the various rules for the governance of public lands and other
forms of public property. A conclusion that this practice is unconstitutional seems
unlikely, and even bizarre.
Accordingly, Professor Schoenbrod devotes considerable attention to the problem
of land management in his book on delegation, concluding that “Congress need not make
rules for the management of government property, such as federal lands, monies, and
corporations like the Postal Service.”235 He offers two reasons for this conclusion. First,
he invokes precedent and practicality236; these are not considerations that bear on original
meaning.237 Second, and more to the point, he notes that Congress gets its power over
federal property from the clause authorizing it “to dispose of and make all needful Rules
and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United
States.”238 Professor Schoenbrod notes that this clause’s location “outside the first three
Articles of the Constitution, which focus on separation of powers,”239 suggests that it might
simply escape Article I’s nondelegation principle.

235

Id. at 186.

236

Id. at 187-88.

237

Perhaps some originalists will argue that precedent is a legitimate source of constitutional meaning. I
have elsewhere launched an uncalibrated assault against that claim. See Gary Lawson, The Constitutional
Case Against Precedent, 17 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 23 (1994). A more calibrated assault would pay
closer attention to historical sources and would distinguish among various forms of and justifications for
precedent. I have been planning that assault for several years; I am far enough along to be sure that it will
not alter the basic message.
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Professor Schoenbrod is right, but in a different way than he imagined.240 The
location of congressional power over property in Article IV is indeed significant – not
because Article IV somehow stands apart from the general constitutional structure but
because of the specific text of the Property Clause. The Property Clause is a self-contained
grant of authority to Congress to “make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the
Territory and other Property belonging to the United States.”241 When Congress passes
laws concerning property management, including laws instructing executive agents to
make rules unconstrained by meaningful standards, Congress does not need to employ the
Sweeping Clause of Article I. The Property Clause itself provides authorization for any
ancillary legislation concerning the subjects within its compass. That clause does not
require laws concerning property to be “necessary and proper”; it merely requires that they
be “needful,” and this power grant functions as an implicit authorization to delegate
legislative power.
To see how this works, consider the ancient institution of territorial legislatures.
Congress has long allowed federal territories to govern themselves (subject to
congressional oversight) through local legislatures, both as a prelude to statehood and as a
matter of democratic theory.242 Those authorizations to territorial legislatures look at first
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Professor Schoenbrod candidly admitted doubts about his own analysis, see id. at 188, and he
ultimately fell back on functional considerations about the extent to which delegation of responsibility over
property management “can be made consistent with the safeguards of liberty.” Id. See id. at 188-89
(identifying circumstances in which delegation concerning property management might threaten liberty and
therefore, on Professor Schoenbrod’s analysis, would be prohibited).
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glance like flagrant delegations.243 But when Congress legislates for territories pursuant to
the Territories Clause, it functions as a general government rather than a limited
government. Accordingly, the normal background rules concerning enumerated powers do
not apply in that context. Within this enumerated sphere of jurisdiction, Congress
functions as a legislature of general powers. Unless the term “needful” can be read to
incorporate background norms of constitutional structure, the Territories Clause therefore
permits Congress to delegate power to other actors. Other constitutional limitations, such
as the Appointments Clause or various individual rights provisions may well limit
Congress’s ability to legislate for the territories, but the Court’s longstanding conclusion
that the nondelegation doctrine simply does not apply to territorial legislation is correct.
The same analysis supports a power to delegate with respect to other forms of
federal property. The Territories Clause is in fact the Territories and other Property
Clause. The text and structure of the clause do not distinguish between territories and
“other Property belonging to the United States.” Congress therefore has general power
over all federal property, just as it has general power over territories and the District of
Columbia. Accordingly, Congress has the enumerated power to authorize executive agents
to, in essence, make laws concerning territorial and property management, even though it
does not (by virtue of the word “proper” in the Sweeping Clause) have such power with
respect to other subjects within Congress’s constitutional jurisdiction.
Finally, there may be certain subject matter areas in which the range of discretion
permitted under the executive power (or the judicial power) is larger than in other areas.
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Professor Mike Rappaport has termed this the “selective nondelegation doctrine.”244 The
basic insight is that as long as Congress is merely charging executive agents with the
exercise of executive power, there is no constitutional problem, and that the scope of the
executive power may vary with the context. For instance, Professor Rappaport has argued
at length that Congress may give the President wide discretion to spend or not spend funds
under appropriation laws, either through lump sum appropriations or through statutes that
authorize spending up to a certain maximum but that do not specify the precise amount that
must be spent.245 He makes an impressive and exhaustive historical and structural case that
the “executive Power” contained in Article II includes this large measure of spending
discretion. He similarly argues that Congress may give the President wide discretion to
implement (or terminate) peacetime arms embargoes,246 and he suggests that there may be
grounds for concluding more generally that the “executive Power” has a broader sweep in
foreign affairs than in domestic affairs.247 I am in no position to dispute his conclusions,
which are entirely consistent with the structure of my argument. Professor Rappaport’s
work highlights the value of, and the need for, comprehensive and careful originalist work
on the meaning of the cryptic phrase “[t]he executive Power.” But that is a task for another
day.248
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How one performs that task is also a question for another day. The differences between my approach
and Professor Rappaport’s are small on the scale of academic disagreements but are nonetheless
substantive. Professor Rappaport captured those differences brilliantly in correspondence when he
observed that his approach to defining key constitutional terms, such as “executive Power,” is essentially
nominalist while mine is essentially conceptualist. By this, he means that he sees history as the primary

III

Many of the most common objections to the nondelegation doctrine have already
been answered. The charge that the nondelegation doctrine is an extra-constitutional
principle with no textual grounding249 is simply false: the Sweeping Clause textually
embodies a nondelegation principle as part of its understanding of “proper” executory laws.
The charge that no workable standard for judging delegations can be formulated is also
false. It is true that application of the Constitution’s nondelegation principle requires
judgment on occasions, but that is an inescapable feature of much of law. Drawing a line
between execution and lawmaking is no harder, and indeed is probably considerably easier,
than drawing a line between reasonable and unreasonable searches and seizures. Indeed,
the most striking aspect of attempts to apply the nondelegation doctrine is the convergence
of the various formulations. I have argued that the formulations put forward by Chief
Justice Marshall, Professor Schoenbrod, and myself are all essentially identical; they
simply reflect different ways of expressing the underlying distinction between lawmaking,
executing, and judging. Professor Redish’s formulation (and that of Sartorius Barber) are
formally different but functionally identical. I have been unable to locate a single real-

vehicle for discerning the content of those terms, while I am more inclined to view such terms as having an
“essentialist” meaning that does not depend on historical usage. Obviously, I regard history as relevant to
interpretation, and Professor Rappaport would never downplay the importance of conceptual and structural
analysis. Nonetheless, while we agree on what evidence is admissible to prove original meaning, we do not
always agree on the relative significance of different kinds of evidence. A full treatment of this question
would require a lengthy discussion of the theory of concepts and how that relates to constitutional
interpretation. It requires, in other words, a lengthy book on originalist methodology which does not yet
exist. For some tantalizingly brief preliminary observations, see infra XX.
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world case in which the different formulations unambiguously point to different outcomes.
(Some of us may in fact reach different outcomes, but that is likely to be a function of
differences in application – in judgment, if you will – rather than intrinsic features of the
various inquiries.) That suggests that application of the nondelegation doctrine may not be
nearly as difficult as the doctrine’s critics typically suppose. Finally, the charge that the
nondelegation doctrine would require elimination of all discretion in governance250 is also
false. Discretion is part of the executive and judicial powers; only when the quality and
quantity of discretion involved passes over into the legislative power does the
nondelegation doctrine take notice.
One additional objection, however, bears mention here. Justice Stevens in
American Trucking relied on the prominent administrative law treatise by Kenneth Davis
and Richard Pierce for the proposition that “[t]he Court was probably mistaken from the
outset in interpreting Article I's grant of power to Congress as an implicit limit on
Congress' authority to delegate legislative power.”251 The treatise, in turn, relies heavily
on some statutes from the First Congress that Professor Davis unearthed many years ago
that supposedly demonstrate that the founding generation did not subscribe to a strict
nondelegation doctrine.252 Professor Davis’s original work discussed six such statutes.
One statute, from the original Judiciary Act, authorized the federal courts “to make and
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See Kenneth Culp Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. Chi. L. Rev. 713, 719-20 (1969). To
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founded.” Id. at 719. The treatise, however, does use these statutes as authority for the proposition that
there is no constitutional limit on delegations. Justice Stevens’ citation to the treatise in American
Trucking, see 121 S. Ct. at XX, was entirely accurate.

establish all necessary rules for the orderly conducting of business in the said courts.”253
Another provision of the Judiciary Act gave district courts power to impose various
penalties in maritime matters, subject only to specification of maximum penalties.254. A
third statute concerned pensions for Revolutionary War veterans. The state and national
governments, under the Articles of Confederation, had provided for pensions to wounded
and disabled veterans. The twenty-fourth statute enacted by the First Congress in 1789
continued those previously-granted pensions for one year “under such regulations as the
President of the United States may direct,”255 with no further direction concerning the
regulations. A fourth statute, from the second session of the First Congress, followed up
this authority by providing that wounded or disabled military personnel “shall be placed
on the list of invalids of the United States, at such rate of pay, and under such regulations
as shall be directed by the President,”256 subject to some specified maximum pay rates. A
fifth statute, also from the second session of the First Congress, authorized the Secretary
of the Treasury to remit or mitigate fines for violation of certain import laws “if in his
opinion the same was incurred without willful negligence or any intention of fraud.”257
Finally, another statute that session prohibited unlicensed trade and intercourse with the
Indian tribes, instructed the executive department to issue licenses “to any proper
person”258 who posted a bond, without providing any definition of a “proper person,” and
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required all licensees to be “governed in all things touching the said trade and
intercourse, by such rules and regulations as the President shall prescribe.”259 Scholars
today continue to cite (at least some of) these statutes as strong evidence that the
founding generation did not understand the Constitution to prohibit delegations.260
The persistent reliance on these statutes demonstrates a continuing confusion
about the nature of originalist analysis that can only be fully dissolved by a separate
article. For now, it is enough to say that statutes of early Congresses are at best weak
evidence of original meaning. Originalist analysis, at least as practiced by most
contemporary originalists, is not a search for concrete historical understandings held by
specific persons. Rather, it is a hypothetical inquiry that asks how a fully informed
public audience, knowing all that there is to know about the Constitution and the
surrounding world, would understand a particular provision. Actual historical
understandings are, of course, relevant to that inquiry, but they do not conclude or define
the inquiry – nor are they even necessarily the best available evidence. Enactments of
early Congresses are particularly suspect because Members of Congress, even those who
participated in the drafting and ratification of the Constitution, are not disinterested
observers. They are political actors, responding to political as well as legal influences,
who are eminently capable of making mistakes about the meaning of the Constitution.
Their work product constitutes post-enactment legislative history that ranks fairly low
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down on the hierarchy of reliable evidence concerning original meaning.261 Accordingly,
whatever evidence can be gleaned from early statutes – and there is evidence in both
directions – is minimally relevant.
Nonetheless, it is worth examining these statutes (and a few others), on the theory
that doubts about their value go to weight rather than admissibility. Moreover, the
continuing invocation of these statutes by critics of the nondelegation doctrine reflects, in
addition to confusion about originalist analysis, significant confusion about the
nondelegation doctrine that warrants attention. It is true that these statutes vest a good
deal of discretion in executive and judicial actors. But the nondelegation doctrine does
not forbid all executive and judicial discretion. It only forbids Congress from vesting the
kind of discretion in executive and judicial actors that falls outside of those actors’
constitutionally enumerated powers. The real question is whether the six statutes
identified by Professor Davis so clearly vest legislative power in executive or judicial
actors that one can draw useful inferences from them about the original understanding of
the nondelegation doctrine. The real answer is no.
The first statute, which authorizes the courts to make rules of procedure, gives no
significant insight into the original understanding of the nondelegation doctrine. If
formulating rules of procedure is part of the “judicial Power,” then the statute delegates
nothing; it is a straightforward use of the Sweeping Clause power to implement and
channel pre-existing constitutional powers of courts. One can argue, of course, that the
“judicial Power” includes no such procedural component but instead is confined solely to
the power to decide cases in accordance with governing law. There is in fact a lively

261

For a much fuller exposition of this point, see Calabresi & Prakash, supra note XX, at 551-59.

debate about the extent to which promulgating rules of judicial procedure is a legislative
function, a judicial function, or some combination of the two.262 It is mercifully
unnecessary to engage in that debate here. The statute would bear on the nondelegation
doctrine only if it was so obvious to the founding generation that courts have no
independent power to set procedural rules that the Judiciary Act can be understood as
reflecting a view about Congress’s ability to delegate legislative powers. That is clearly
not the case, however one ultimately resolves the constitutional status of rules of judicial
procedure.263
The second statute, which authorized courts to impose penalties subject only to
specification of maximums, is even less evidence of a lack of concern for delegations.
The power to exercise sentencing discretion is a part of the “judicial Power” to decide
cases. The power to fashion a remedy (within traditional forms and limits) is clearly part
of the traditional case-deciding power.264 If there was a common law of crimes, then the
power to fashion a sentence (remedy) in that context would also be part of the judicial
power. The existence of a serious dispute about that question265 is some evidence that a
power to exercise sentencing discretion within congressionally prescribed limits is
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closely enough related to the traditional remedial powers of courts to pose no delegation
problem.
The third statute, which continued the pre-Constitution pension scheme for
veterans, seems to give the President a completely free hand in determining regulations
for the pension scheme. Doesn’t that demonstrate that the First Congress was
unconcerned about delegation?
Consider exactly how far the President’s power under this statute extends. The
statute continues a pre-existing pension scheme. That means that such matters as
eligibility criteria, payment amounts, and the like are already fixed by the statute through
incorporation from the previous statutory scheme. Could the President validly
promulgate regulations changing the amounts of the pensions, extending pensions to
postal workers, or limiting the pensions only to wounded veterans from New York?
Clearly not; the basic decisions about the structure of the pension scheme are all fixed by
statute. The President’s power to enact regulations obviously concerns such matters as
forms of application, procedures for determining eligibility, proof of claims, etc. These
are not trivial matters by any means, but they are not the central issues of a legislative
scheme for pensions for war veterans. They concern what one might call ancillary
matters, or perhaps matters of “less interest,” that the Constitution does not require
Congress to resolve. This statute accordingly charges the President with nothing more
than standard executive tasks and therefore poses no delegation problem for originalists.
The succeeding statute that authorized the President to set pay levels for wounded
or disabled military personnel is more troubling. There is nothing in the statute that the
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President can interpret, or execute, in order to set the pay level. Nor is this an instance of
presidential discretion under an appropriations statute; the President is determining the
level of a private benefit, not the spending priorities under an appropriation. The only
way in which this statute would not raise a nondelegation problem would be if the
“executive Power” includes an especially wide range of discretion with respect to
military matters – which is certainly a distinct possibility.266
The fifth statute, which authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to remit or
mitigate certain fines, is a bit trickier than the others but ultimately yields the same
conclusion about early understandings of delegation. The statute gives the Secretary
power to remit or mitigate fines “if in his opinion the same was incurred without willful
negligence or any intention of fraud.” Doesn’t this effectively give the Secretary
untrammeled discretion to let lawbreakers off the hook?
The answer is yes, but the statute simply reflects and refines power that the
Secretary already had. The executive department always has prosecutorial discretion to
decide which instances of lawbreaking to pursue and what levels and kinds of statutorilypermitted penalties to seek. It is thus a routine part of the executive function for
executive officials to have discretion concerning imposition of penalties. The only twist
with this statute is that the fine is first imposed and then remitted rather than not being
imposed in the first place. That may even be a difference with substance; formalists,
after all, are concerned with form. But the most that one could draw from this example
would be carelessness in drafting with regard to the manner in which the executive will
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exercise prosecutorial discretion. As a window into early understandings concerning
delegation, it lets in very little light.
The last statute, concerning trade with Indian tribes, is a more serious matter.
That statute essentially instructs the President to go forth and do good with respect to
trade with Indian tribes. It is doubtful at best whether the statute sufficiently makes the
important policy decisions with respect to qualifications of traders or the terms on which
trade is permitted. Again, the question is whether the “executive Power” has a
sufficiently broad sweep in the area of foreign affairs (which this statute plainly
concerns) to permit Congress to give the President more discretion in this context than in
others.267
None of the six statutes cited by Professor Davis unambiguously cast doubt on the
vitality of the nondelegation principle. At most, we can give him two out of six. That
may be enough to win a batting title, but it will not build constitutional doctrine. One
certainly could not conclude from these statutes, even under the interpretations most
favorable to Professor Davis, that the founding generation did not regard nondelegation
as a basic principle. It is far more likely that the First Congress got a few wrong than that
the Constitution does not contain a robust nondelegation principle.
If one wants to trade examples, supporters of a nondelegation principle can cite an
interesting episode from the Second Congress. The Constitution grants Congress the
power to "establish Post Offices and post Roads."268 A bill introduced in the Second
Congress to establish post roads specifically designated, town by town, the routes by which
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mail was to be carried. An amendment was introduced in the House to authorize the
carriage of mail "by such route as the President of the United States shall, from time to
time, cause to be established."269 Several representatives objected strenuously that the
amendment would unconstitutionally delegate legislative power to the President.
Representative Page, for example, declared:
If the motion before the committee succeeds, I shall make one which will save a
deal of time and money, by making a short session of it; for if this House can, with
propriety, leave the business of the post office to the President, it may leave to him
any other business of legislation; and I may move to adjourn and leave all the
objects of legislation to his sole consideration and direction.270
The amendment was defeated, and the final legislation specifically designated the routes
that were established as post roads.271 The first post road established, for example, was
described in the statute as follows:
From Wisscassett in the district of Maine, to Savannah in Georgia, by the
following route, to wit: Portland, Portsmouth, Newburyport, Ipswich, Salem,
Boston, Worcester, Springfield, Hartford, Middletown, New Haven, Stratford,
Fairfield, Norwalk, Stamford, New York, Newark, Elizabethtown, Woodbridge,
Brunswick, Princeton, Trenton, Bristol, Philadelphia, Chester, Wilmington,
Elkton, Charlestown, Havre de Grace, Hartford, Baltimore, Bladensburg,
Georgetown, Alexandria, Colchester, Dumfries, Fredericksburg, Bowling Green,
Hanover Court House, Richmond, Petersburg, Halifax, Tarborough, Smithfield,
Fayetteville, Newbridge over Drowning creek, Cheraw Court House, Camden,
Statesburg, Columbia, Cambridge and Augusta; and from thence to Savannah
. . . .272
Doesn’t this absurd degree of specificity, in the face of direct comments about delegation,
demonstrate that proponents of the delegation doctrine were right?
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Not necessarily. There are many reasons why Congress would choose to designate
postal routes in detail, and one of them leaps to mind: postal routes were the eighteenthcentury equivalent of water projects. Being on a postal route was obviously an economic
advantage (much as being on a railroad route would become an economic advantage a
century later). In an era of relatively limited government, postal routes may well have been
some of the tastiest pork that Congress was able to serve. Why would it let the President
get credit for placing towns on the postal route, any more than the modern Congress would
let the President have the responsibility, and therefore the credit, for the location of water
projects?
In the end, all of these speculations from the actions of early Congresses are of
minimal value. Perhaps a clear, consistent practice would be a good indication of original
public meaning, but the episodic data that history gives us, in both directions, is
unenlightening. Its probative value may well outweigh its potential for prejudice (though
that is something that one could dispute), but that value pales before the available evidence
from text, structure, and design.
Many critics of the nondelegation doctrine do not really question (or care) whether
the original meaning of the Constitution includes a nondelegation principle. Instead, they
simply, directly or indirectly, urge decisionmakers to be guided by something other than
original meaning. That position does not concern me here. This article is not a prescription
for decisionmaking. It is a straightforward exposition of the nondelegation principle that is
contained in the Constitution. If decisionmakers don’t want to follow the Constitution, that
is their business. I ask only that they do it openly and honestly.

